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REPLACING THE FLAWED CHEVRON STANDARD
BRIAN G. SLOCUM*
ABSTRACT
Judicial review of agency statutory interpretations depends heavily
on the linguistic concept of ambiguity. Most significantly, under
Chevron, judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation hinges on
whether the court determines the statute to be ambiguous. Despite its
importance, the ambiguity concept has been poorly developed by
courts and deviates in important respects from how linguists ap-
proach ambiguity. For instance, courts conflate ambiguity identifica-
tion and disambiguation and treat ambiguity as an umbrella concept
that encompasses distinct forms of linguistic indeterminacy such as
vagueness and generality. The resulting ambiguity standard is un-
predictable and does not adequately perform its function of mediat-
ing between judicial interpretive autonomy and deference to agency
interpretations.
This Article offers a novel alternative to the problematic ambigui-
ty concept. Rather than the current binary choice between clarity
and ambiguity, different types of linguistic issues should call for
different judicial treatment. Instead of the ambiguity trigger for
deference, courts should presume that certain categories of issues are
judicially resolvable while other categories are for the agency to re-
solve. The categories proposed in this Article reflect the traditional
view that courts are experts at statutory interpretation (which
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includes determining congressional intent), and agencies are experts
at policymaking (which includes exercising delegated discretion). The
categories thus provide a framework for the allocation of interpretive
authority between courts and agencies on the basis of their respective
areas of expertise. Furthermore, the proposed framework offers a bet-
ter account of significant cases, such as the famous King v. Burwell
case where the Court refused to defer to the agency’s interpretation,
than does the Court’s own explanations.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts have given an outsized role to the concept of ambiguity in
statutory interpretation. For example, a finding of statutory am-
biguity is necessary before some judges will consult legislative his-
tory.1 As well, a determination of ambiguity often allows a court to
apply a canon of statutory construction and select an interpretation
on the basis of normative concerns. For instance, if an interpre-
tation raises a serious constitutional question, a determination of
ambiguity allows a court to select a different interpretation.2 In
criminal cases, a finding of ambiguity dictates an interpretation in
favor of the defendant.3 Similarly, in administrative law ambiguity
serves a crucial role because it often mediates between judicial and
agency interpretive authority. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,4 often declared to be one of the
most influential administrative law decisions of the twentieth cen-
tury, if a provision is ambiguous a reasonable agency interpretation
will receive deference from the reviewing court.5 In fact, the D.C.
Circuit asserts as a precondition of deference that the agency
recognize that the statutory provision is ambiguous.6 Furthermore,
even if an agency’s interpretation is confirmed by a reviewing court,
the agency may select a different interpretation in the future only
if the original court deemed the provision to be ambiguous.7
1. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative
History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 72 (2012) (“The Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals routinely invoke legislative history when statutory text is ambiguous.”).
2. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697-99 (2001) (explaining the ambiguity in
the statute before applying the canon of constitutional avoidance).
3. See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420 (2006) (explaining
that the rule of lenity “requires that a court interpreting a criminal statute resolve any
ambiguity in favor of the defendant”).
4. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All
These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 731 (2014) (“[T]he Chevron decision has been the most-
cited Supreme Court administrative law decision, and the Chevron doctrine has spawned
legions of law review articles analyzing its numerous twists and turns.”).
6. See Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 757, 760, 765 (2017) (discussing D.C. Circuit decisions that reveal an expectation that
agencies assert statutory ambiguity in order to receive Chevron deference).
7. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
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It should not be surprising that the concept of ambiguity has been
given such a significant role in interpretive outcomes. The legal
realist notion that there is not inevitably one “correct” answer to
every interpretive question, but rather multiple plausible resolu-
tions are often available, suggests the need for some mechanism to
signal situations involving interpretive choice.8 Thus, under Chev-
ron, a court may determine that the statute requires or precludes
the agency’s interpretation, but it may also find that the statute
neither requires nor precludes the agency’s interpretation.9 Step
One of Chevron requires an independent judicial evaluation, via
“traditional tools of statutory construction,” of whether “Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”10 If, instead,
“the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific is-
sue,” the reviewing court proceeds to Step Two and determines
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.”11 Ambiguity was seen by the Court as a “gap
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,” which requires the “for-
mulation of policy and the making of rules” that agencies are better
equipped to make than courts.12 The ambiguity concept thus medi-
ates between interpretation (Step One) and policymaking (Step
Two) and also shifts the judicial focus from the traditional function
of selecting the “best reading” of a statute.13 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion.”).
8. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”).
9. See Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 610 (2014)
(“There are three possible outcomes in every case involving judicial deference to an agency
interpretation: (i) the statute clearly means what the agency says, (ii) the statute is
ambiguous as to what the agency says, or (iii) the statute is clearly contrary to what the
agency says.”); see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part) (referring to the “pre-Chevron days, when there was thought to be only one ‘correct’
interpretation of a statutory text”).
10. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
11. Id. at 843.
12. Id. 
13. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2121 (2016) (explaining that the primary function of courts is to determine the “best read-
ing” of a statute). 
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In creating the ambiguity doctrine, the judiciary has transformed
a neutral linguistic concept into a uniquely legal concept. Linguists
distinguish, via various tests and definitions, between ambiguity
and other forms of potential indeterminacy such as vagueness, po-
lysemy, and generality.14 Furthermore, natural languages are said
to be pervasively ambiguous, but an ambiguous expression is not al-
ways indeterminate in the sense that the intended meaning is un-
clear to the comprehender.15 Linguists thus distinguish between the
identification of ambiguity and disambiguation.16 In contrast to the
linguistic conception of ambiguity, though, courts conflate ambiguity
identification and disambiguation and also use ambiguity as an um-
brella concept that encompasses the various forms of indetermi-
nacy.17 These actions have created an unpredictable doctrine that
does not satisfactorily mediate between judicial interpretive au-
tonomy and deference to agency interpretations.
As various commentators have observed, there is an enormous
body of scholarship that has been devoted to Chevron.18 Very little
of the scholarship, however, has focused on the ambiguity concept,
and there are no comprehensive, interdisciplinary analyses of it.
Recently, though, Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, while not offering a
detailed alternative in administrative cases, wondered whether
courts should “avoid attaching serious interpretive consequences to
binary ambiguity determinations that are so hard to make in a
neutral, impartial way.”19 This Article agrees that the ambiguity
concept is a problematic device for allocating interpretive authority
in administrative cases. Through an interdisciplinary comparison
of the linguistic concept of ambiguity and the judicially created legal
doctrine of ambiguity, this Article argues that courts should
eliminate the ambiguity concept, thereby transforming the Chevron
doctrine. The Article further outlines an alternative linguistic
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,
1867 (2015) (“At this point, it takes chutzpah to write about Chevron. Everyone is sick to
death of Chevron, and four gazillion other people have written about it, creating a huge pile
of scholarship and precious little left to say.”).
19. See Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2144.
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framework that better allocates interpretive authority to judges and
policymaking authority to agencies.
Part I explains that part of the uncertainty regarding the division
of interpretive authority between courts and agencies is due to
Chevron’s incoherent treatment of legislative “intent.”20 While in-
terpretive issues are generally judicially decidable on the basis of
perceived legislative intent, the Court indicated that provisions that
are “ambiguous” may be interpreted by the agency on the basis of
policy concerns.21 The Court’s superficial description of legislative
intent and the possibility of multiple permissible meanings of
statutory provisions is in tension with the historical inclination of
judges to choose interpretations that represent the “best readings”
of statutes.22 Furthermore, as Parts II and III explain, the judicial
conception of ambiguity is different from how linguists generally use
the term. In particular, the judicially created ambiguity concept
elides the separate issues of ambiguity identification and disambig-
uation, as well as the various forms of indeterminacy. When ambi-
guity identification and disambiguation are conflated, ambiguity
determination depends on an assessment of the available evidence,
but the determination is a conclusion that is not based on any lin-
guistic tests or useful definitions.23 
The ambiguity concept does not add structure to the interpretive
process in a way that would make it more objective and less ideo-
logical than interpretation outside of the administrative context.24
Considering the judicial conflation of ambiguity identification and
disambiguation, there is no obvious point in the interpretive pro-
cess, prior to its completion, where a reviewing court can stop the
process and declare the provision to be ambiguous.25 There is
therefore no objective standard to determine whether the determi-
nation is correct or incorrect (unlike linguists’ tests, which are
20. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
21. Id. at 842-43.
22. See Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2121.
23. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (describing judicial definitions of
ambiguity).
24. See Beermann, supra note 5, at 731-32 (indicating that when applying Chevron the
“Court generally split along familiar ideological lines, with liberals deferring to liberal agency
interpretations and conservatives deferring to conservative agency interpretations”).
25. See infra Part IV.
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theoretically based and can at least be verified by others).26 As a
result, no stable standard exists for mediating between contextual
disambiguation that tracks legislative intentions and a determina-
tion that the provision is ambiguous and agency discretion is there-
fore legislatively intended.
The Chevron doctrine has been the subject of renewed criticism
and is said to be “entering a period of uncertainty, after long seem-
ing to enjoy consensus support on the Court.”27 Despite these
criticisms, some form of deference is likely to continue.28 Any crit-
ique of Chevron that focuses primarily on linguistic issues (as this
article does) is necessarily incomplete, though, due to the multiple
justifications for deference and the likelihood of doctrinal con-
straints on any deference doctrine. Consider that the Chevron de-
cision itself emphasized the existence of congressional intent that
agencies resolve statutory uncertainties as well as the greater ex-
pertise and political accountability of agencies compared to courts.29
Other theories for Chevron include the views that agencies are
superior to courts in ascertaining congressional intent and that
deference is a judicially self-imposed constraint to assuage concerns
about courts’ counter majoritarian role under the Constitution.30 In
26. See infra Part IV.
27. Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decisions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (“In retrospect, it makes sense to view the many cases in which the Court
failed to apply Chevron consistently as signals of underlying doctrinal doubt.”).
28. See  Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1392, 1398 (2017) (“Chevron deference, or something much like it, is a necessary
consequence of and corollary to Congress’s longstanding habit of relying on agencies.”); Cory
Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2017) (“At a broad
level of generality, something like the two-step framework may always exist, even if relabeled
or disavowed.”).
29. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute
its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”); id. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices.”); id. (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are
not part of either political branch of the Government.”).
30. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institu-
tional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 411, 446-48 (arguing that a “comparative institutional analysis suggests that
Chevron’s domain should be expanded to include all interpretations promulgated by an
agency’s governing board or director”); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) (arguing that Chevron is a judicially self-imposed constraint).
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addition, various considerations have been thought by the Court to
be relevant to deference, including the formality of the agency pro-
cedures used when promulgating the interpretation.31
Notwithstanding the incompleteness of any linguistic critique of
deference, as well as the ineffectiveness of the ambiguity concept,
Part IV argues that it is intuitive that indeterminacy should play a
role in the allocation of interpretive authority. In the absence of
indeterminacy congressional intent must be implemented in most
cases and, thus, there is no basis for deferring to an agency’s inter-
pretation.32 Conversely, when indeterminacy does exist there may
be no discernable congressional intent to implement, and though the
interpretive issue may still be decidable by a court (as interpretive
issues generally are), even before Chevron it was widely thought
that the agency’s views regarding the interpretive issue should be
influential.33 Thus, the basic principle, expressed in Chevron and
elsewhere, that indeterminacy should signal some sort of additional
judicial consideration of the agency’s interpretation is coherent,
even if determining the role that indeterminacy should play has
proven to be difficult.
Part IV also outlines an alternative to the traditional Chevron
doctrine. First, courts should eliminate the ambiguity trigger, which
arbitrarily mediates between de novo judicial interpretation and
deference to agency interpretations. Instead of the umbrella am-
biguity concept, which does not distinguish among different forms
of indeterminacy, courts should consider that different types of in-
determinacy may call for different judicial treatment.34 Second, an
understanding that interpretive issues are judicially resolvable
should replace the current judicial practice of deciding whether
to defer at some undetermined point in the interpretive process,
as happens with the ambiguity concept. The judicial resolvability
of interpretive issues means that certain types of indeterminacy
are judicially resolvable while other types of indeterminacy are
31. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005).
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See generally Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpre-
tation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017).
34. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text (describing the umbrella ambiguity
concept).
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presumptively for the agency to resolve. Taking account of such
nuance would help make judicial review more coherent, as well as
better match likely congressional intent about delegation of in-
terpretive issues to agencies.
This Article proposes three different categories as a collective
replacement for the umbrella ambiguity concept, which is under-
inclusive as a description of the types of linguistic phenomena rele-
vant to judicial review. The groupings reflect the traditional view
that courts are experts at statutory interpretation (which includes
determining congressional intent) and agencies are experts at pol-
icymaking (which includes exercising delegated discretion).35 The
categories thus provide a framework for the allocation of interpre-
tive authority between courts and agencies on the basis of their
respective areas of expertise. Furthermore, various Supreme Court
decisions (including Chevron,36 the infamous anti-Chevron case INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca,37 and the controversial case interpreting the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, King v. Burwell38), re-
flect the distinctions represented by the categories, although the
Court has consistently—and confusingly—treated the issues as
though they fall under the ambiguity concept.
I. JUDICIAL DECIDABILITY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Part of the enduring uncertainty regarding Chevron’s division
of interpretive authority between courts and agencies is due to
the enigmatic nature of “intent.” The Court in Chevron indicated
that when congressional intent is unclear, the provision is am-
biguous, which signals interpretive choice. The Court thereby
established a connection between “ambiguity” and the absence of
congressional intent.39 This legal-realist view of the existence of
35. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 530 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Chevron framework thus accounts for the different institutional
competencies of agencies and courts: Courts are expert at statutory construction, while
agencies are expert at statutory implementation. That the distinction can be subtle does not
lessen its importance.”). 
36. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
37. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
38. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
39. 467 U.S. at 842-43 (explaining that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter,” but if it is not clear, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer
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multiple meanings as signaling interpretive choice is in tension,
however, with the historical inclination of judges to choose interpre-
tations that represent the “best readings” of statutes.40 It is natural
for courts to believe that interpretive questions are inherently
judicially decidable in the sense that a best reading can be given the
relevant language. Generally, words—and correlatively, senten-
ces—can be given meanings, and any residual uncertainty can be
resolved through consideration of the overall legislative design of
the statute.41 Especially if a court considers broad contextual
evidence, it is not difficult to understand why some courts feel
confident about averring “correct” answers even in the face of ep-
istemic uncertainty about the legislature’s intended meaning re-
garding some specific issue.
The general decidability of interpretive issues on the basis of
legislative intent suggests that intent is a protean concept that can
be framed at various levels of generality.42 At a high level of
generality, “intent” is synonymous with “purpose” and may always
be said to exist, even if the judge has to infer the purpose from the
is based on a permissible construction of the statute”).
40. See Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2121 (arguing that instead of determining whether
a provision is ambiguous, “courts should seek the best reading of the statute by interpreting
the words of the statute, taking account of the context of the whole statute, and applying the
agreed-upon semantic canons”). Some might argue, though, that even under Chevron courts
should seek the “best reading” of a statute. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (“Only when the court
concludes that the policy furthered by neither textually possible interpretation will be clearly
‘better’ (in the sense of achieving what Congress apparently wished to achieve) will it,
pursuant to Chevron, yield to the agency’s choice.”).
41. The term “legislative design” will be used throughout this Article and is meant to refer
to the totality of contextual cues courts often consider when making sense of a provision,
such as information from legislative history and related provisions.
42. Unless otherwise indicated, this Article will refer to legislative “intent” in a general
way that captures both the textualist notion of objectified intent and the intentionalist notion
of actual intent or purpose. While scholars and judges have suggested a variety of interpretive
methodologies, the basic division is between judges, known as textualists, who privilege the
linguistic meaning of a legal text and judges, known as intentionalists, who privilege the
intent or purpose of the legislative body that enacted the text. See generally Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009). While
differences in interpretive methodology may influence case outcomes, the arguments pre-
sented in this Article do not presuppose any particular methodology. Instead, they assume the
basic, and widely accepted, premise that courts interpret statutes as the “faithful agents” of
Congress. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6
(2006) (explaining that prevailing views see judges as either “‘faithful agents’ or ‘coequal
partners’ of Congress”).
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statutory language and broader legislative design.43 Many of the
determinants of intent employed by judges (for example, dictionar-
ies, canons of interpretation, statutory purpose) seek an objectified
or hypothetical intent of some sort and do not depend on actual
legislative consideration of the interpretive issue.44 As a very gen-
eral matter, then, interpretive issues are judicially decidable on the
basis of legislative “intent,” defined broadly, even if there is no
evidence that the specific interpretive issue was ever contemplated
by the legislature (or any of its members).
Perhaps, as the Supreme Court recently suggested in King v.
Burwell, inferences about legislative intent (even if objectified or
hypothetical) are more reliable if the interpretive issue is crucial to
the overall legislative design.45 In King, the Court indicated that
some interpretive questions are, as a category, judicially decidable
with no possibility of deference to the agency due to sufficient epi-
stemic certainty regarding congressional intent.46 The case required
the Court to interpret the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA), which sought “to make health insurance more affordable
by giving refundable tax credits to individuals with household in-
comes between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty
line.”47 The ACA also “require[d] the creation of an ‘Exchange’ in
each State where people can shop for insurance, usually online. An
Exchange [could] be created in one of two ways.”48 A state itself
could create an Exchange.49 If a state “[chose] not to establish its
own Exchange, the [ACA] provide[d] that the Secretary of Health
43. For an example of the Supreme Court inferring legislative purpose from the broad
legislative design, see the discussion of King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), and FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), in Part IV.D.3.
44. See BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING 76-79 (2015) (describing how both
intentionalists and textualists rely on hypothetical notions of legislative intent). Even
legislative history may arguably reveal actual legislative intent but often provides information
about general purpose. See id. at 77-78.
45. 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (explaining that “[i]n extraordinary cases” deference should not
be given the agency’s interpretation and, instead, the task of the reviewing court is “to
determine the correct reading” of the provision (citations omitted)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2487 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012)).
48. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012)).
49. Id.
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and Human Services ‘shall ... establish and operate such Exchange
within the State.’”50
The interpretive issue for the Court arose because the ACA, in 28
U.S.C. § 36B(b)-(c), provided that the tax credits would be available
to “taxpayer[s] [who] ha[d] enrolled in an insurance plan through
‘an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the
[ACA].’”51 The Treasury Department, through the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), promulgated a regulation interpreting the ACA as
allowing for tax subsidies in healthcare Exchanges established by
the federal government.52 The challengers to the regulation argued
that the agency’s interpretation contradicted the plain meaning of
the statute.53
In upholding the government’s regulation, the Court relied heav-
ily on the purpose of the ACA, which indicated that tax “credits are
necessary for the Federal Exchanges to function like their State
Exchange counterparts,” and sought to “avoid the type of calami-
tous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid.”54 Although the
Court agreed with the government’s interpretation of the ACA, it
refused to accord deference to the regulation interpreting the stat-
ute.55 Invoking an earlier decision, FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,56 the King Court stated that “[i]n extraordinary cases
... there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
has intended ... an implicit delegation [of interpretive authority to
the agency].”57 The Court explained:
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s
key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year
and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of peo-
ple. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges
50. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012)).
51. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)-(c) (2012)).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 2488, 2492, 2495.
54. Id. at 2495-96.
55. See id. at 2488-89, 2494-96 (finding that Congress did not leave the issue of whether
the tax credits would be available on the Federal Exchanges up to the IRS, but later coming
to the same conclusion that “an Exchange established by the State” in § 36B includes State
and Federal Exchanges).
56. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
57. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at
159).
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is thus a question of deep “economic and political significance”
that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so
expressly.58
The Court thus rejected the possibility that the agency’s interpreta-
tion might receive deference and instead concluded, based on its
own weighing of the evidence, that “the context and structure of the
Act compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most nat-
ural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase,” thereby “allow[ing]
tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange created under
the Act.”59
In refusing to apply the Chevron framework, the Court did not
view itself as arrogating the power to decide policy issues under the
statute to the judiciary (at the expense of the agency).60 Rather, the
Court assumed that for issues “central” to the statutory scheme
there would be sufficient indications of congressional intent to
make the issue judicially decidable.61 The Court thus did not decide
the case under Step One but instead rejected the Chevron frame-
work altogether.62 In foreclosing the very possibility of deference,
the Court implicitly indicated that the decidability of the interpre-
tive question did not depend on the language of the statute. The
Court was likely not implying that Congress always drafts impor-
tant provisions with greater semantic clarity, considering the poor
drafting of the ACA and the Court’s decision to reject the literal
meaning of “State” on the basis of the context and purpose of the
overall statute.63 Rather, the theory is that when cases present such
important issues, the judiciary is able to determine the best reading
of the statute on the basis of the available evidence.64
58. Id. at 2489.
59. Id. at 2495-96.
60. See id. at 2488-89.
61. See id. at 2489.
62. Id. (“Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of
deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central to this statutory scheme; had Con-
gress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”
(quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014))).
63. See id. at 2492 (“The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of
inartful drafting.”).
64. Id. at 2489.
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The Court’s position in King that interpretive issues “central” to
the legislative design are judicially decidable thus depends on a
kind of systemic confidence in the judiciary’s ability to determine
the best reading of a statute in such situations, even when the stat-
utory language is unclear. In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
in defending the idea that the interpretive question was judicially
decidable, the Court cited Justice Breyer’s 1986 law review article
for the proposition that courts should not interpret Chevron as
creating an across-the-board presumption of deference to agencies.65
Rather, in the view of Justice Breyer, deference should vary based
on, among other things, the importance of the statutory question at
issue.66 Justice Breyer argued that “Congress is more likely to have
focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving inter-
stitial matters to ... daily administration” by agencies.67 Whether
Congress always “answers” major questions (which would seem to
be the claim if the Chevron framework is not applicable to such
issues) may be correct, but its relevance is thus dependent on the
epistemic verifiability of congressional intent in such cases.68
The Court in King resolved the interpretive dispute on the basis
of the legislative design (including drawing inferences from related
provisions and statutory purpose) and seemed to limit its rejection
of Chevron to interpretive issues that are “central”; but, as ad-
dressed above, courts may always determine meaning (whether it
is based on general, objectified, or hypothetical intent). If a court
frames intent in a general manner, it should typically be inclined to
believe that the interpretive question is decidable and, in fact, has
a correct answer. The complication is that the Court in Chevron
rejected the notion that courts should define intent at a high level
of generality.69 Instead, the Court indicated that a reviewing court
65. 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)).
66. See Breyer, supra note 65, at 371-77.
67. See id. at 370 (citation omitted).
68. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 994-97 (2013) (explaining that congressional drafters “feel an obligation
to address major questions and that Congress is not trying to ‘punt’ big decisions as often as
some theorists have assumed”).
69. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“First, always, is the question whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” (emphasis added)).
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should determine whether Congress had expressed an intention
regarding the “precise question at issue.”70 In Chevron, the Court of
Appeals had conceded that the relevant provisions were indetermi-
nate and the precise issues not “squarely addressed in the legisla-
tive history.”71 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that “the purposes
of the nonattainment program should guide our decision here.”72 In
reversing the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court indicated
that “[t]he basic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a
static judicial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had
decided that Congress itself had not commanded that definition.”73
The Court stated that “[o]nce it determined, after its own examina-
tion of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have an intent
regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit pro-
gram,” the reviewing court was to consider only whether the agen-
cy’s interpretation was “reasonable.”74
Even though it seemed to describe the appropriate level of gen-
erality at which to frame the issue of congressional intent, the
Court’s opinion in Chevron was nevertheless unsatisfying. For one,
the “precise question at issue” language is not an accurate descrip-
tion of how courts approach the interpretation of statutes, if precise
issue is taken to mean either that the semantic meaning of the
relevant provision must clearly answer the interpretive question or
the legislative history must indicate that the legislature explicitly
considered the issue.75 Courts often consider broad contextual evi-
dence when determining ambiguity.76 Logically, such broad con-
textual evidence could dictate a certain interpretation even if the
legislature had not explicitly expressed an intention on the precise
question at issue.77 Imagine a scenario where the semantic meaning
70. Id. at 843.
71. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
72. Id. at 726 n.39.
73. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
74. Id. at 845.
75. See infra Part IV.D. for examples of cases where the Court did not limit itself to
determining whether Congress explicitly answered the “precise issue.”
76. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“So when deciding whether the
language is plain, we must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme.’ Our duty, after all, is ‘to construe statutes, not isolated
provisions.’” (citations omitted)).
77. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (“[A]n agency inter-
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of the relevant provision is indeterminate (if considered in isola-
tion), and the legislative history does not contain any indication that
Congress ever explicitly considered the interpretive issue. Never-
theless, the structure of the statute, including related provisions
and the obvious purpose of the legislation, is clearly at odds with the
agency’s interpretation. It seems unlikely in such a scenario that a
reviewing court would determine that the provision is ambiguous (or
that the court should accept the agency’s interpretation).78 Not
surprisingly, reviewing courts have found statutes to be clear on an
issue even if there is no evidence that Congress considered the
precise question at issue.79 
The idea of legislative intent might be a coherent notion but it is
also a general one.80 Chevron framed ascertainable legislative intent
as being in contradistinction to ambiguity,81 but “intent” is a mal-
leable concept that can be framed at different levels of generality.82
The Court’s discussion of intent in Chevron was superficial, and the
notion that courts should determine “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue” is at odds with how courts
pretation that is inconsistent with the design and structure of the statute as a whole does not
merit deference.” (quotations and citations omitted)).
78. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (“A [statutory] provision that to an agency may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme ... because
only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the
rest of the law.” (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484
U.S. 365, 371 (1988))). It is possible that the reviewing court could find the statute to be
ambiguous but reject the agency’s interpretation at Step Two, although the court might be-
lieve there is little to gain by moving to Step Two when there is no chance that the agency
interpretation could be upheld.
79. For example, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court concluded that the Controlled Sub-
stances Act prescription requirement did not authorize the Attorney General to bar dis-
pensing controlled substances for assisted suicide in the face of a state medical regime
permitting such conduct. 546 U.S. 243, 274-75 (2006). The Court did not base its decision on
explicit congressional consideration of assisted suicide but, rather, on the fact that the
“statute manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.” Id. at 270.
80. There are some “intent skeptics” who doubt the coherence of the concept of legislative
intent. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 2397 (2017). This Article does not take a position on the coherence of legislative intent,
other than to note that it can be framed at varying levels of generality and its determination
is typically of particular concern to judges. See generally id.
81. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
82. See generally Manning, supra note 80. Furthermore, the existence of ambiguity does
not always prevent an interpreter from accurately ascertaining intent. See infra notes 189-201
and accompanying text (explaining how the presence of ambiguity often makes communi-
cation more efficient).
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typically discuss and determine intent.83 Thus, combined with the
traditional judicial decidability of interpretive questions, Chevron’s
reference to legislative intent confounds rather than clarifies the
role of ambiguity in mediating between judicial and agency inter-
pretation.
II. LINGUISTS AND INDETERMINACY
While the ascertainability of congressional intent was intended
by the Court in Chevron to signal judicially decidable interpretive
issues, the correlative notion of “ambiguity” represents judicially un-
decidable situations. Recall that whereas congressional intent must
control in Step One, provisions that are “ambiguous” may be inter-
preted by the agency on the basis of policy considerations.84 The
concept of ambiguity is thus intended to mediate between court-
centered interpretation (Step One) and agency-centered policymak-
ing (Step Two), thereby making ambiguity identification of crucial
significance to the division of interpretive responsibility.85 Despite
its centrality to judicial review, “ambiguity,” like the “intent” con-
cept, was not explicated by the Court in Chevron, and, in fact, was
implied to be a self-evident concept.86 Ambiguity as developed by
courts, though, is a problematic concept in some important ways,
and the judicial conception of it differs from how ambiguity is an-
alyzed by linguists. Before describing in Part III how the judicial
conception of ambiguity makes its determination intrinsically dis-
cretionary and subjective and thus unpredictable, this Part explains
how indeterminacy is analyzed by linguists.
Linguists frequently note that natural languages, including En-
glish, are massively ambiguous.87 They often divide ambiguous
83. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
84. See id. at 845.
85. See Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD.
L. REV. 791, 799, 802 (2010).
86. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The Court did little more than refer to “intent”
generically. See supra note 39.
87. See Elin Fredsted, On Semantic and Pragmatic Ambiguity, 30 J. PRAGMATICS 527, 532
(1998); Brendan Juba et al., Compression Without a Common Prior: An Information-Theoretic
Justification for Ambiguity in Language, INNOVATIONS COMPUTER SCI., 79 (2011) (“Natural
language is ambiguous.”); Steven T. Piantadosi et al., The Communicative Function of Ambi-
guity in Language, 122 COGNITION 280, 280 (2012) (“Ambiguity is a pervasive phenomenon
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expressions into two categories.88 An expression is lexically ambigu-
ous if it has two or more unrelated lexical meanings.89 In contrast,
an expression is syntactically ambiguous if it has two or more pos-
sible logical structures.90 Thus, when linguists examine ambiguity,
it is usually at the sentential, phrasal, or word level.91 Ambiguous
expressions are therefore merely potentially indeterminate in the
sense that the relevant context may disambiguate the expressions.92
Furthermore, linguists do not use the term “ambiguity” to refer
to all expressions that are potentially indeterminate.93 In addition
to ambiguity, three other basic categories are typically used to iden-
tify and describe the causes of semantic indeterminacy. Two of the
categories account for an expression’s multiple meanings. An ex-
pression may be lexically ambiguous, as indicated above.94 In con-
trast, an expression is polysemous if it has two or more (related)
senses of one lexical meaning.95 The distinction between polysemy
and lexical ambiguity concerns the “relatedness of the meanings.”96
Polysemy, which is a feature of most natural language expressions,
involves meanings that are more closely related, although the dis-
tinction operates on a continuum rather than a bright line.97 The
expression “bank” is often used as an example of lexical ambiguity
because it can mean either a financial institution or the slopes bor-
dering a river. The expression is, thus, in reality unrelated words
which happen to look and sound alike.98 “Bank” is also polysemous
in language which occurs at all levels of linguistic analysis.”); Thomas Wasow et al., The
Puzzle of Ambiguity, in MORPHOLOGY AND THE WEB OF GRAMMAR: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
STEVEN G. LAPOINTE 265 (C. Orhan Orgun & Peter Sells eds., 2005) (stating that “ambiguity
abounds in natural languages” and “English is massively ambiguous”).
88. See Wasow et al., supra note 87, at 266-67.
89. See DAVID LANIUS, STRATEGIC INDETERMINACY IN THE LAW (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 16) (on file with author).
90. See id. (manuscript at 14).
91. See Word Meaning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/word-meaning/ [https://perma.cc/X5H6-M92R].
92. See LANIUS, supra note 89 (manuscript at 11-12).
93. See Brendan S. Gillon, Ambiguity, Generality, and Indeterminancy: Tests and Defini-
tions, 85 SYNTHESE 391, 393-95 (1990).
94. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
95. See LANIUS, supra note 89 (manuscript at 17).
96. See id. (manuscript at 18).
97. See id.
98. See Polysemy Is Like Homonomy, Only Different, SCIENCEBLOGS, (Nov. 3, 2006),
http://scienceblogs.com/mixingmemory/2006/11/03/polysemy-is-like-homonomy-only/ [https://
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because it can mean a financial institution or the building where a
financial institution offers services.99
The other two categories account for indeterminacy regarding an
expression’s single meaning. In contrast to lexical ambiguity and
polysemy, an expression is semantically vague if its meaning “al-
lows for borderline cases.”100 For instance, a gradable adjective such
as “tall” is vague because it allows for borderline cases and, thus,
multiple, equally permissible, ways to apply the expression.101 The
term, viewed in its context of usage, has a core of settled meaning,
but there will be borderline cases that can be decided either way
(often arbitrarily),102 akin to H.L.A. Hart’s famous (within the law)
“core of settled meaning” and “penumbra of debatable cases” frame-
work.103 When borderline cases are possible, it is often said that
the expression is “fuzzy.”104 Expressions such as “many friends” or
“about 20” are fuzzy because the phrases may have an invariant
core (for example, 100,000 is not “about 20” but 19.999 is) but an
indistinct boundary that often varies depending on the context.105
Similarly, the referential boundaries of expressions like “city” and
“town” are also not clear-cut.106
Somewhat differently, an expression is general if its meaning is
a “genus of more than one species.”107 Thus, for example, the term
“color” is general because it includes within its scope “red,” “green,”
“blue,” et cetera.108 The term “parent” is general because it includes
perma.cc/RF9J-7CFQ].
99. Id.
100. See LANIUS, supra note 89 (manuscript at 21).
101. See id. (manuscript at 174-75).
102. See DIANA RAFFMAN, UNRULY WORDS: A STUDY OF VAGUE LANGUAGE 106 (2014)
(claiming that “vagueness is a form of arbitrariness”).
103. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958). 
104. The term “fuzziness” is used in linguistics and philosophy of language to describe the
boundaries of categories (such as “vehicle”) that are “ill-defined, rather than sharp.” M. LYNNE
MURPHY & ANU KOSKELA, KEY TERMS IN SEMANTICS 72 (2010). Commentators often describe
fuzziness as a type of vagueness.
105. Grace Zhang, Fuzziness—Vagueness—Generality—Ambiguity, 29 J. PRAGMATICS 13,
14-15 (1998) [hereinafter Zhang, Fuzziness-Vagueness]; see also Grace Zhang, Fuzziness and
Relevance Theory, 22 FOREIGN LANGUAGE & LITERATURE STUD. 73, 74-75 (2005) [hereinafter
Zhang, Relevance Theory].
106. See Zhang, Fuzziness-Vagueness, supra note 105, at 18.
107. Gillon, supra note 93, at 394.
108. Id.
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within its scope “mother” and “father.”109 As these examples suggest,
the more general the expression is, the less informative the utter-
ance becomes (and vice versa).110 Yet, whether generality causes
indeterminacy depends on an expression’s context of use (which
includes the purpose of the conversation).111 One can easily imagine
scenarios when “color” or “parent” could be used when indetermi-
nacy would not result.
Some types of semantic indeterminacy require a more nuanced
description than those given above, and the additional nuance
makes it less likely that context will make the expression at issue
more determinate. For instance, multi-dimensional polysemy exists
when it is unclear which features are aspects of a word’s lexical
meaning, resulting in two or more (related) senses.112 In turn, multi-
dimensional vagueness exists when an expression allows for bor-
derline cases due to incommensurability among the expression’s
features.113 For example, the term “intelligent” (like “reasonable”) is
potentially indeterminate, based on multi-dimensional polysemy,
because it may be unclear which features must be instantiated in
order to fall within the concept.114 The term may be applied based
on some combination of “one’s capacity for memory, abstract
thought, self-awareness, communication, learning, emotional know-
ledge, creativity and problem solving,” or on the basis of other fea-
tures.115 It may, however, be debatable which possible features must
be present or how those features are to be “weighted against each
other in cases of conflict or doubt.”116 Competent language users
may thus reasonably disagree about which features are intrinsic to
the concept itself.117 Similarly, the term may be multi-dimensionally
vague because some of the features may be “instantiated to a high
degree and others to a low degree” (for example, a person may have
an excellent memory but poor problem solving skills).118 In such a
109. Id.
110. Cf. id.
111. See id. at 394-95.
112. See LANIUS, supra note 89, (manuscript at 33).
113. See id.
114. See id. (manuscript at 32-33).
115. Id. (manuscript at 32).
116. Id.
117. See id. (manuscript at 33).
118. Id.
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situation, the features may not be properly compared, making them
incommensurable and resulting in borderline cases where the ex-
pression neither clearly applies nor clearly does not apply.119
Finally, some expressions may be indeterminate because their
meaning is relative to a contextually valued standard, which may
be difficult to determine precisely.120 For example, the meaning of
“fast,” “big,” or “reasonable” depends on some standard or compar-
ison class.121 Determining the comparison or standard is often de-
pendent on context and sometimes requires that an evaluative
judgment be made (for example, what is “cruel and unusual punish-
ment” or “due process”?).122 As a result, the discretion (as well as the
uncertainty) inherent in evaluating context is also present when
determining the specifics of the comparison class or standard.123
Even when all of the relevant contextual facts are known, there still
may be significant disagreement about the comparison standard or
class and how it should be applied.124
Linguists often use devices, such as definitions and tests, to
describe and identify ambiguity and distinguish it from other forms
of indeterminacy, such as vagueness and generality.125 Nevertheless,
despite these distinctions, it may be observed that a routine sen-
tence containing ambiguity, like “Chunka hit a man with a stick,”126
might not lead to comprehension difficulties because “context is also
a crucial factor in communication” and would indicate the correct
meaning.127 The ability to assess context and interpret ambiguous
119. See id.
120. See TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 131 (2000).
121. See, e.g., id.
122. See id. at 133 (“To judge what comes within the comparison class is not to answer a
question of fact whose precise answer is unknowable, but to make an evaluative judgment
concerning what matters for the purpose in question. This fact ties the unspecificity of context
dependence to the vagueness of evaluation.”).
123. See id. at 132.
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Gillon, supra note 93, at 393-95, 406-07. Although linguists distinguish
among different forms of indeterminacy, there is debate regarding the tests used to identify
the different forms. See, e.g., David Tuggy, Ambiguity, Polysemy, and Vagueness, 4 COGNITIVE
LINGUISTICS 273, 273 (1993) (“Traditional linguistic tests for ambiguity vs. vagueness fail to
yield clear judgments in such cases, and in fact can easily be made to yield opposing judg-
ments by varying the context.”).
126. See Gillon, supra note 93, at 407.
127. See Varol Akman, Rethinking Context as a Social Construct, 32 J. PRAGMATICS 743,
745 (2000).
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communications is understood to be an important aspect of commu-
nicative, as well as cultural, competence.128 The intrinsic context for
understanding a speaker is quite broad and includes the “totality of
the knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions that are shared by the
speaker and the listener, a.k.a. the common ground.”129 An ambigu-
ous expression may thus be present in a context which renders the
expression univocal (i.e., having one meaning), sometimes without
the language user being aware of the ambiguity.130 For instance, the
sentence following the one above may indicate that “Chunka
dropped the stick after hitting the man with it.” Some other
indication of the correct meaning, such as the title in a written
document, may also be present.131
Sentences like the one above illustrate the difference between
ambiguity and disambiguation.132 A distinction between the two is
commonly made by linguists who study how context enables listen-
ers in a conversation to disambiguate ambiguous words, along with
the various other ways in which language is disambiguated.133 The
distinction illustrates that the presence of ambiguity does not mean
that the correct meaning is undiscoverable by the audience of the
communication.134 In fact, in many cases the expression can be
disambiguated and the correct meaning identified. Still, in these
situations ambiguity nevertheless exists, even though disambigu-
ation is possible.
128. See id. at 745-46.
129. Id.; see also id. at 745 (explaining that context can include “(i) the words around a
word, phrase, statement, etc. often used to help explain (fix) the meaning; [and] (ii) the
general conditions (circumstances) in which an event, action, etc. takes place”).
130. See Fredsted, supra note 87, at 532 (“[M]ost semantic ambiguities are resolved by
context and situation without the user of the language being aware of them.”).
131. For example, the sentence may be in a book chapter with the title “Deadly Assaults
with Sticks” or “Chunka Uses a Stick to Hit a Man.”
132. See LANIUS, supra note 89, (manuscript at 13-14) (explaining that “[e]ven though
many utterances contain ambiguous expressions, they are not necessarily indeterminate”
because “[c]ontext can fail or succeed to disambiguate an ambiguous expression”).
133. See, e.g., Nicholas Asher & Alex Lascarides, Lexical Disambiguation in a Discourse
Context, 12 J. SEMANTICS 69 (1995).
134. This is true however “correct meaning” is defined, whether by reference to the actual
intent of the speaker or some objectified notion of intent. See supra note 42 (explaining the
difference between textualism and intentionalism).
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III. THE JUDICIARY AND AMBIGUITY
In various ways, judges do not treat ambiguity in the same way
as do linguists.135 One significant difference, which helps explain the
other differences, is that judges typically treat ambiguity as an
umbrella concept that covers any sort of meaning indeterminacy,
including the forms described earlier (for example, vagueness, poly-
semy, generality).136 Sometimes, the term “ambiguity” is used to
describe any situation when opposing interpretive arguments are
deemed to be equally persuasive, irrespective of the presence of lin-
guistic indeterminacy.137 The judicial labeling of any type of inter-
pretive uncertainty as “ambiguity” is unsurprising. Distinguishing
among different forms of indeterminacy can be difficult, the ac-
curacy of the various tests used by linguists to identify and distin-
guish among different indeterminacies is disputed, and identifying
the kind of indeterminacy at issue may not have doctrinal signifi-
cance.138 Furthermore, in litigation there are typically two opposing
parties with each advocating in favor of a particular interpretation.
A reviewing court, remembering that ambiguity is typically defined
by judges as a provision that has more than one meaning, might
naturally conclude that the provision is unambiguous if there is one
clearly preferred meaning and ambiguous if there is not.139 Still,
notwithstanding these mitigating factors, the judiciary’s typical
process of determining ambiguity has led to confusion and an often
arbitrary allocation of interpretive authority between courts and
agencies.140
135. See Slocum, supra note 85, at 799-800.
136. See id. at 801.
137. The King v. Burwell case is one such example. See infra notes 381-403 and
accompanying text; see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“The parties disagree
over whether coercion or duress is relevant in determining if an alien assisted or otherwise
participated in persecution. As there is substance to both contentions, we conclude that the
statute has an ambiguity that the agency should address in the first instance.”).
138. See supra note 125.
139. See Slocum, supra note 85, at 799, 802-03.
140. See id. at 811.
2018] REPLACING THE FLAWED CHEVRON STANDARD 219
A. Judicial Conflation of Ambiguity and Disambiguation
The judicial treatment of ambiguity as an umbrella concept,
encompassing various forms of indeterminacy, has naturally led to
definitions of ambiguity that are unhelpful, as well as inconsistent
and incoherent.141 The definitions sometimes focus on an objectified
interpreter and whether that interpreter would find the provision
to be ambiguous.142 While such a standard is undoubtedly intended
to make the ambiguity determination external to the perhaps idi-
osyncratic views of the reviewing judge, it does not provide any tests
or criteria for making that determination. Other definitions focus on
the provision itself and contain language indicating that ambiguity
exists if the provision is “susceptible” to more than one meaning.143
Such definitions similarly do not offer any tests or useful criteria for
judging susceptibility. Thus, regardless of the focus (interpreter or
provision), the definitions read as broadly worded boilerplate that
fail to guide a court’s determination of whether a provision is
ambiguous.144
In addition to the conflation of various forms of indeterminacy
under the ambiguity umbrella and consequent absence of a mean-
ingful standard for determining ambiguity, an additional fact sep-
arates legal and non-legal treatment of ambiguity. Namely, despite
the prevalence of ambiguity in natural languages, the significant
effects of labeling a provision as ambiguous in some situations (for
example, interpreting a criminal provision in favor of the defendant
via the rule of lenity) makes it understandable that judges would be
reluctant to readily find ambiguity.145 The reluctance to find
141. See id. at 794.
142. See id. at 800.
143. Id. at 801.
144. See id. at 801-02.
145. Certainly, courts are more reluctant to find ambiguity in some contexts than in others.
The New Rule of Lenity, supra note 3, at 2421 (explaining how the Rehnquist Court “did not
apply the rule [of lenity] to every ambiguous penal statute”). Even in the Chevron context
some judges are reluctant to declare a provision to be ambiguous and defer to the agency
interpretation. See Scalia, supra note 40, at 521 (“It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will
require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally
adopt.”). In fact, there is empirical evidence that Justice Scalia tended not to give deference
to interpretations with which he disagreed. See Beermann, supra note 5, at 732 (indicating
from a study on Justices’ voting records that “Justice Scalia’s eleven votes against deference
was the highest number of votes among the Justices against deference”).
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ambiguity is manifested in the judiciary’s tendency to conflate am-
biguity identification and disambiguation. The conflation of the two
means that courts do not declare a provision to be ambiguous on the
basis of lexical or syntactic ambiguity (i.e., ambiguity identification),
but instead consider broad contextual evidence for indications of
authorial intent as part of the determination.146 The Supreme Court
has consistently asserted that “[a]mbiguity is a creature not of def-
initional possibilities but of statutory context.”147 Courts must there-
fore interpret statutory words in their context and with a view “to
their place in the overall statutory scheme,” which the court must
presume is symmetrical and coherent.148 Thus, language that a lin-
guist might identify as ambiguous, if viewed in isolation, is deemed
to be unambiguous by courts if the relevant context can disambigu-
ate the language.149
The judicial conflation of ambiguity identification and disam-
biguation means that courts must consider in every interpretive
dispute both what words mean as a general matter and what they
mean in a particular context. Chevron Step One requires the court
to determine whether the provision at issue is clear or, instead,
ambiguous, but a court’s role is not to decide whether a provision is
clear in every respect (i.e., without regard to the issue presented).150
If done correctly, this would always result in a finding of am-
biguity.151 Instead, the court’s role is to decide whether the provision
is clear with respect to the interpretive issue presented. For
example, the dispute may involve what most commentators would
term lexical fuzziness.152 In such cases, a court should not frame the
interpretive issue as being whether, for example, the term “vehicle”
is ambiguous but, instead, whether the term includes within its
146. See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (“A [statutory] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme ... because only one of the permissible meanings produces
a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” (citations omitted)).
147. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
148. Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989).
149. See id.
150. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
151. As linguists sometimes assert, it is impossible to make a completely determinate
sentence. See Alex Barber, Indeterminacy, in KEY IDEAS IN LINGUISTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LANGUAGE 92, 95 (Biobhan Chapman & Christopher Routledge eds., 2009).
152. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (describing the linguistic concept of
fuzziness).
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scope the object in dispute (for example, a Segway) in light of the
legislative design.153 Alternatively, the interpretive dispute may
involve polysemy.154 In such cases, the court should not describe the
interpretive issue as requiring it to determine, for example, whether
the statutory phrase “major stationary source” is ambiguous but,
instead, whether its meaning precludes the government’s “bubble”
interpretation in light of the legislative design.155
In exploring word meanings and how context contributes to
meaning, linguists often distinguish between “semantic” meaning
and “pragmatic” meaning.156 Semantics accounts for meaning by
relating, via the rules of the language and abstracting away from
specific contexts, linguistic expressions to the world objects to which
they refer.157 A semantic meaning is therefore compositional (i.e.,
rule-governed) and convention based.158 Thus, in a legal context,
semantics would include determining the ordinary meaning of the
textual language, which may include consideration of some tradi-
tional tools of interpretation like textual canons of interpretation.159
In turn, pragmatics accounts for meaning by reference to the lan-
guage user (producer or interpreter), and it involves inferential
processes.160 Context is thus centrally involved in explaining how
153. See Hart, supra note 103, at 607.
154. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (describing polysemy). 
155. See infra note 245 and accompanying text (describing the “bubble” interpretation at
issue in Chevron). Of course, the court should not use the term “ambiguity” at all, considering
that the interpretive dispute could be said to involve multi-dimensional polysemy (as opposed
to ambiguity) because it is unclear what features are aspects of the lexical meaning of “major
stationary source.” See infra notes 243-47 (describing the indeterminacy at issue in Chevron).
In any case, under the proposed framework in Part IV, the issue would be classified as one
of semantic indeterminacy resolution.
156. See MIRA ARIEL, DEFINING PRAGMATICS 6 (2010) (describing the “semantics/pragmatics
division of labor”).
157. See id. at 24. There is a wide, and sometimes contradictory, range of ways in which
philosophers and linguistics have used the terms “semantic” and “pragmatic.” See id. at 4-16.
A general description of the distinction, though, is sufficient for present purposes.
158. “The principle of compositionality states that the meaning of a complex linguistic
expression is built up from the meanings of its composite parts in a rule-governed fashion.”
MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 104, at 36. Thus, a sentence is compositional if its meaning
is the sum of the meanings of its parts and of the relations of the parts. 
159. Textual canons are presumptions that are drawn from the drafter’s choice of words,
their grammatical placement in sentences, and their relationship to other parts of the “whole”
statute. See SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 181-202 (analyzing whether textual canons help
determine the ordinary meaning of a legal text).
160. See ARIEL, supra note 156, at 4-8, 28.
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pragmatics complements semantics. Pragmatics takes account of
contextual factors, such as the mutual knowledge shared by the
speaker and addressee.161 The interpreter seeks to identify the
utterer’s intention in making the utterance by considering what the
utterer said and the way she said it.162 Pragmatics is therefore
concerned with whatever information is relevant to understanding
an utterance, even if such information is not reflected in the syntac-
tic properties of the sentence.163 In legal cases, pragmatic informa-
tion might therefore include evidence from legislative history, even
if that information does not assist in determining the ordinary
meaning of the textual language.164
If a given provision is deemed by a court to be ambiguous, it must
be viewed as multivocal with respect to the interpretive question
based on a combination of general language usage (i.e., semantics)
and the meaning of the language in some particular context (i.e.,
pragmatics).165 Despite the importance of conventional word mean-
ings, and other objective determinants of meaning, they do not pro-
vide the sole basis for interpretations, either outside of the law or
for judges.166 Semantic meaning that cuts across contexts is always
overlaid by context-specific pragmatic determinants of meaning that
can shape and change the ultimate meaning of the communica-
tion.167 Ignoring this pragmatic (i.e., contextual) evidence results in
the interpreter not taking sufficient note of the circumstances which
161. Cf. id.
162. See id. at 24.
163. See id. at 28.
164. Legislative history is pragmatic evidence because it “allows the interpreter to consider
the particular context surrounding the enactment of a statute and make inferences about
legislative intent based on that evidence.” Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary
Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1430.
165. See SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 107-09 (explaining how legal interpretation depends
on both generalizations about language usage and inferences from the specific context of the
statute).
166. See Akman, supra note 127, at 745 (discussing the importance of context).
167. See Fredsted, supra note 87, at 532 (explaining that ambiguity is manifest in the use
of language where “a stable logical-semantic kernel of meaning exists” that is “overlaid by an
unstable context specific pragmatic meaning”). In fact, many scholars agree with the
“linguistic underdeterminacy thesis,” which holds that “[t]he linguistically encoded meaning
of a sentence radically underdetermines the proposition a speaker expresses when he or she
utters that sentence.” Yan Huang, Neo-Gricean Pragmatics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PRAGMATICS 70 (Yan Huang ed., 2017).
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regulate natural language comprehension.168 Yet, accounting for
both semantic and pragmatic evidence in the ambiguity determina-
tion will naturally involve the same, often ideological, debates about
the weighing of semantic meaning and contextual evidence that
occur outside of the administrative context.169
Considering the judicial conflation of ambiguity identification and
disambiguation, there is no obvious point (either as a matter of lan-
guage or in the law) in the interpretive process, prior to its comple-
tion, where a reviewing court can stop and declare the provision to
be ambiguous. There is therefore no objective standard to determine
whether the determination is correct or incorrect (unlike linguists’
tests, which are theoretically based and can at least be verified by
others).170
B. Judicial Confusion About Ambiguity
The uncertainties of the judicially created ambiguity concept,
including the conflation of ambiguity identification and disam-
biguation, have helped to elide the analytic distinction between
Chevron’s Step One and Step Two. Typically, regardless of the kind
of indeterminacy involved, a legal interpretive dispute is resolved in
the context of litigation, where the court considers two competing
interpretations. If the court determines that the provision is am-
biguous, it has, according to one common judicial definition of
ambiguity, decided that there are at least two plausible interpreta-
tions, which would typically be the two interpretations offered by
the opposing parties.171 If so, the Step Two question of “reasonable-
ness” has also been decided, unless Step Two is additionally con-
cerned with whether the agency adequately explained why it chose
one plausible interpretation rather than another.172 The natural
168. See Fredsted, supra note 87, at 532.
169. See supra note 42 (describing textualism and intentionalism).
170. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
172. Some commentators have suggested that Step Two review should consider whether
the agency’s interpretive methodology and reasons for selecting its interpretation are not
“arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion” in violation of Section 706(2)(A) of the
Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s
Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 621 (2009); Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron
Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2365 (2018). 
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tendency of the Step One ambiguity determination to also decide the
reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation accounts for why some
commentators claim that Chevron should be properly viewed as
having only one step.173
The judiciary’s conflation of ambiguity identification and dis-
ambiguation also means that linguistic indeterminacy can be
present in situations where legislative intent is discernable, even
though a judicial declaration of ambiguity signals the non-
identifiability of congressional intent.174 The uncertainty of this
process has caused ambiguity determination to be seen as subjec-
tive, both within and outside the Chevron context.175 Even the
extent to which ambiguity identification and disambiguation should
be conflated is not clear. Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in
National Cable & Telecommunication Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Ser-
vices,176 where the Court indicated that “[a] court’s prior construc-
tion of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled
to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”177 In a later case, United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,178 the Court had to in-
terpret its decision in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner,179 decided more
than five decades earlier, and determine whether it had deemed the
relevant statutory language to be ambiguous.180 The Court in Home
Concrete reasoned that although it indicated in Colony that the
173. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One
Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009). Nevertheless, sometimes a court will invalidate an agency’s
interpretation at Step Two. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit
Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2017) (explaining that 93.8 percent of agency interpretations
that made it to Step Two were upheld). 
174. For a discussion of the judiciary’s conflation of ambiguity determination and
disambiguation, see infra Part III.A.
175. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the beholder, I remain
convinced that it is unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of a statute as determinative of
whether legislative history is consulted.”); Scalia, supra note 40, at 520-21 (“How clear is
clear? It is here, if Chevron is not abandoned, that the future battles over acceptance of agency
interpretations of law will be fought.”).
176. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
177. Id. at 982 (emphasis added).
178. 566 U.S. 478 (2012).
179. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
180. Home Concrete & Supply, 566 U.S. at 480.
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relevant language was not “unambiguous,” it was able to discern
congressional intent by consulting legislative history, thus render-
ing the provision unambiguous.181 The Court, in essence, indicated
that “linguistic ambiguity” is not sufficient to make a provision am-
biguous.182
In response, Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, argued that
the Court was confusing ambiguity identification with disambig-
uation, indicating that the Court’s reliance on legislative history
and statutory coherence were
the sorts of arguments that courts always use in resolving am-
biguities. They do not prove that no ambiguity existed, unless
one believes that an ambiguity resolved is an ambiguity that
never existed in the first place. Colony said unambiguously that
the text was ambiguous, and that should be an end of the mat-
ter.183
Note that Justice Scalia’s argument was not that contextual
evidence should not be considered by courts, but rather that some
determinants of meaning are relevant to ambiguity identification
rather than disambiguation.184 The Court did not address Justice
Scalia’s argument, however, nor did the Court indicate that there
are any restrictions on the evidence that can be considered when
determining ambiguity.185 Some have argued that Chevron’s ra-
tionale or changing judicial views on the proper determinants of
meaning should preclude the inclusion of some determinants of
meaning as “traditional tools” of statutory interpretation.186 These
181. Id. at 482.
182. Id. at 488-89 (“There is no reason to believe that the linguistic ambiguity noted by
Colony reflects a post-Chevron conclusion that Congress had delegated gap-filling power to
the agency.”).
183. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. See id.
185. Id. at 487-90 (majority opinion). Similarly, other than declaring that courts should
apply “traditional tools of statutory construction” in Step One, the Court in Chevron did not
instruct courts on how to manage contextual considerations. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
186. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1517, 1517 (2014) (“[T]he Court’s understanding of the ‘traditional tools’ of statutory
interpretation has changed” and legislative history should no longer be considered a
“traditional tool.”).
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arguments, although relevant to the administration of Chevron, do
not address the definition or nature of ambiguity.
C. Evaluating the Judicially Created Ambiguity Standard
The judicial conflation of ambiguity identification and disam-
biguation has had various consequences, including the unhelpful
definitions of ambiguity and confusion about when ambiguity should
be declared. These consequences cast doubt on whether the am-
biguity concept is well-suited to fulfill its doctrinal purpose of me-
diating between judicial autonomy (Step One) and agency discretion
(Step Two).187 Even so, the judicial conflation of ambiguity and
disambiguation is arguably a coherent response to the entrenched
nature of ambiguity in natural languages and, correlatively, the
judicial need to limit its doctrinal significance by connecting it to the
absence of discernable congressional intent rather than linguistic
indeterminacy. In fact, connecting ambiguity to intent is consistent
with recent psycholinguistic theories of language processing.188
These theories only offer limited support for the ambiguity concept,
though, if linguistic ambiguity cannot be as efficiently disambigu-
ated in statutory interpretation cases as it is in nonlegal communi-
cation.
Scholars have recently demonstrated that efficient communica-
tion systems will contain ambiguity as long as context is informative
about meaning.189 Thus, ambiguity can result from a rational pro-
cess of communication and can act as a functional property of
language which allows for greater communicative efficiency.190 An
efficient communication system may produce ambiguous language
when it is examined out of context but will not express information
187. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (explaining Step One and Step Two of the
Chevron doctrine).
188. See Juba et al., supra note 87, at 2.
189. See id. (“[I]t is easy to justify ambiguity to anyone who is familiar with information
theory.”); Hannah Rohde et al., Communicating with Cost-based Implicature: a Game-
Theoretic Approach to Ambiguity, in PROCEEDINGS OF SEMDIAL 2012 (SEINEDIAL) 108 (Sarah
Brown-Schmidt et al. eds., 2012) (“Rather than avoiding ambiguity, speakers show behavior
that is in keeping with theories of communicative efficiency that posit that speakers make
rational decisions about redundancy and reduction.”); Piantadosi et al., supra note 87, at 280.
190. See Rohde et al., supra note 189, at 108.
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already provided by the context.191 Listeners are good at disambigu-
ating in context, and therefore any effort the speaker makes to
express a distinction that listeners could have inferred is, in effect,
wasted effort.192 Evidence from language processing indicates that
comprehenders are able to quickly use contextual information in
the form of discourse context, local linguistic context, or more global
world knowledge in disambiguating language.193 Comprehenders
continually make inferences about what speakers are intending to
convey.194 In fact, inference is “cognitively cheap” and articulation
expensive, which means that normal human communication re-
quires the comprehender to make continual inferences about
speaker intention and, at the same time, does not require the
speaker to fully articulate every shade of meaning.195
Researchers have demonstrated that systems that strive for
communicative or cognitive efficiency will be naturally ambiguous,
and the presence of ambiguity in natural languages should not
therefore be puzzling.196 The pressure of communicative ease may
come at the cost of clarity, requiring comprehenders to actively use
context to disambiguate meaning, but ease does not necessarily
undermine efficiency if disambiguation is not prohibitively costly.197
In many communicative situations, speakers easily infer the in-
tended meaning on the basis of various items of evidence, including
that provided by context.198 Thus, if there are at least two meanings
that are unlikely to occur in the same contexts, speakers can
191. See Juba et al., supra note 87, at 79 (“In context, the intended meaning is often clear,
and hence shorter communication is preferred.”); Piantadosi et al., supra note 87, at 281
(“[W]here context is informative about meaning, unambiguous language is partly redundant
with the context and therefore inefficient.”).
192. See Juba et al., supra note 87, at 80-81, (“[I]t would be infeasible to print a ‘sentence
dictionary’ of what every sentence or document might mean in any context. However, such a
mapping is, to some extent, implicitly computable in people’s minds.”); Piantadosi et al., supra
note 87, at 289.
193. See Piantadosi et al., supra note 87, at 289.
194. See id. 
195. STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE THEORY OF GENERALIZED
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 29 (2000) (arguing that the design requirements of natural
languages “maximize[ ] inference”).
196. See Piantadosi et al., supra note 87, at 282.
197. See id. at 284.
198. See id. (“[T]he inference involved in disambiguation does not appear to be especially
costly. In many if not all communicative situations, speakers easily infer a rich set of
pragmatic and social consequences of language use.”).
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improve the linguistic system by introducing ambiguity.199 If dis-
ambiguation is costly, though, a language with ambiguity would no
longer be efficient, and the necessity of using information from
context to infer the correct meaning would substantially impede
comprehension.200 Such a result could occur if key information is
omitted from the context or the system re-uses particularly difficult
linguistic elements.201
Outside of law, the presence of ambiguity is not a license for the
audience to exercise discretion in determining the speaker’s mean-
ing. Rather, as indicted above, ambiguity’s function is to promote
efficiency in communication.202 If the communicative system of
legislative inscription and judicial interpretation were “easy,” con-
flation of ambiguity identification and disambiguation would be
efficient.203 The system would allow for ambiguity yet still involve
messages that are efficiently produced, communicated, and pro-
cessed.204 The ambiguity concept as developed by courts might
therefore not be problematic if the resolution of linguistic indetermi-
nacy in legal texts was routine and uncontroversial, but such res-
olution is costly.205 Contextual inference may be “cognitively cheap”
and articulation expensive in nonlegal communications, but in-
ference in legal interpretation, although unavoidable, is expen-
sive.206
Perhaps most importantly, the research on the efficiency of am-
biguity is of limited usefulness to legal texts because ambiguity is
199. See id.
200. See id. 
201. See id.
202. See LEVINSON, supra note 195, at 29 (explaining that much of a speaker’s intent is not
explicitly coded in language but inferred through the comprehender’s knowledge of likely
intentions, conventions of interaction, and common sense knowledge about the world);
Piantadosi, et al., supra note 87, at 282 (“[A]mbiguity likely results from ubiquitous pressure
for efficient communication.”).
203. See Piantadosi et al., supra note 87, at 281 (“An easy communication system is one
which signals are efficiently produced, communicated, and processed.”).
204. See id. at 281 (“An easy communication system is one which signals are efficiently
produced, communicated, and processed.”).
205. Cf. Rohde et al., supra note 189, at 108 (“Using ambiguous forms to convey meaning
depends in part on the listener’s ability to diagnose the source of the ambiguity: Does the
ambiguity likely arise from the speaker’s own production decisions or from other factors that
make the expression noisy or unclear.”). 
206. Cf. id.
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only one form of indeterminacy.207 Context may often enable com-
prehenders to disambiguate, or resolve polysemy, but a richer set of
contextual cues is often necessary to precisify a vague or general
expression (especially when it is multi-dimensionally polysemous or
vague), or give a determinate meaning to a contextually valued
standard.208 The inefficiency of indeterminacy in legal texts is a
function, in part, of the costs of resolving indeterminacy and the
unpredictability of interpretive results.209 Unpredictability is caused
by methodological differences among judges, as well as the inherent
variances in judicial interpretive judgments that occur when
contextual determinants are being weighed.210 The resolution of
indeterminacy in legal texts thus allows for judicial discretion,
which is consciously exercised and often informed by ideology and
other non-language considerations that are largely empirically un-
tested.211
The ambiguity concept created by judges is thus irredeemably
flawed. The judicially created umbrella ambiguity concept elides the
separate issues of ambiguity identification and disambiguation, as
well as the various forms of indeterminacy, but the superficial
simplicity of the standard and existing definitions also obscures the
intractable problem of how reviewing courts are to identify ambigu-
ity.212 When ambiguity identification and disambiguation are con-
flated, ambiguity determination depends on an assessment of the
available evidence, but the determination is a conclusion that is not
based on any linguistic tests or useful definitions.213 As a result,
207. See supra notes 89-124 (describing the various forms of indeterminacy).
208. For example, with a contextually valued standard, determining the comparison
standard sometimes requires that an evaluative judgment be made, which involves discretion
and is not likely something that would be fully fleshed out by the legislature only in the
context of the statute and not in the language of the statute itself. See supra notes 120-24
(describing the challenges of contextually valued standards).
209. See Beermann, supra note 5, at 741-50.
210. See id. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (discussing the factors that predict agency win rates,
including the applicability of Chevron).
211. See SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 81-82 (explaining the non-empirical nature of legal
interpretation).
212. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (describing judicial definitions of
ambiguity).
213. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
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there is no stable standard for mediating between contextual
disambiguation that tracks legislative intentions and a determina-
tion that the provision is ambiguous and agency discretion is
therefore legislatively intended.214
The flaws inherent in the ambiguity concept thus extend beyond
the concept’s inability to foreclose the ideologically charged disputes
about interpretive methodologies.215 In fact, the ambiguity concept
adds to the discretion and uncertainty that is central to the Chevron
standard.216 As a device for allocating interpretive power between
courts and agencies, the ambiguity concept is not well-designed to
serve the role that courts have assigned it.217 Rejection of the am-
biguity concept in favor of some alternative that better performs the
task is therefore warranted.
IV. SOURCES OF INDETERMINACY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR
ALLOCATING INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
Even though the ambiguity concept is not able to coherently
allocate interpretive authority between courts and agencies, it is
intuitive that indeterminacy should play a role in the allocation of
interpretive authority. In the absence of indeterminacy, congressio-
nal intent typically must be implemented and there is no basis for
deferring to an agency’s interpretation. Conversely, when indetermi-
nacy does exist there may be no discernable congressional intent to
implement. Though the interpretive issue may still be decidable by
a court (as interpretive issues generally are), even before Chevron
it was widely thought that in these situations the agency’s views
regarding the interpretive issue should be influential.218 Thus, the
basic principle, expressed in Chevron and elsewhere, that indeter-
minacy should signal some sort of additional judicial consideration
of the agency’s interpretation is coherent, intuitive, and perhaps
214. See Beermann, supra note 5, at 731-32 (indicating that, when applying Chevron, “the
Court generally split along familiar ideological lines, with liberals deferring to liberal agency
interpretations and conservatives deferring to conservative agency interpretations”).
215. See supra note 42 (describing the basic division regarding interpretive methodology
that extends beyond the administrative state).
216. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (explaining the Chevron standard).
217. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
218. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of
the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6-29 (2013) (describing pre-Chevron law).
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inevitable, even if determining the role that indeterminacy should
play is difficult.219
This Part outlines how indeterminacy should be relevant to
judicial review. The basic premise is that instead of the umbrella
ambiguity concept—which does not distinguish among different
forms of indeterminacy—courts should consider that different types
of indeterminacy call for different judicial treatment.220 Taking
account of such nuance would help make judicial review more
coherent, as well as better match likely congressional intent about
delegation of interpretive issues to agencies. The proposed frame-
work would also eliminate the ambiguity trigger, which arbitrarily
mediates between de novo judicial interpretation and deference to
agency interpretations. Instead of deciding whether to defer at some
undetermined point in the interpretive process, as happens with the
ambiguity concept, courts should instead declare that interpretive
issues, properly defined, are judicially resolvable. The notion that
interpretive issues are judicially resolvable should lead to the con-
clusion that, due to the nature of language and legal interpretation,
certain types of potential indeterminacy are presumptively judi-
cially resolvable while other types of potential indeterminacy are
presumptively for the agency to resolve.221
A. A New Framework for Judicial Review
Courts should first recognize that “ambiguity” is underinclusive
as a description of the types of linguistic phenomena relevant to ju-
dicial review. Various types of indeterminacy were described earlier
in this Article, but not all of them require a distinct standard of
review. Rather, many of them present similar issues relevant to the
allocation of interpretive authority between courts and agencies.222
Instead, three different categories are proposed: (1) Semantic Inde-
terminacy Resolution, (2) Structural Indeterminacy Reconciliation,
219. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
220. See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text (describing the umbrella ambiguity
concept).
221. See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between
semantics and pragmatics).
222. See supra Part II.
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and (3) Literal Meaning Mandatoriness.223 Although bright-line
distinctions are not always possible to maintain, the three catego-
ries present different interpretive questions for courts.
Consider a brief introductory description of the three categories
using H. L. A. Hart’s famous hypothetical involving a legal rule that
“forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park.”224 A semantic
indeterminacy resolution issue might, for example, involve a dispute
about the meaning of the term “vehicle” and whether a Segway falls
under the definition. In turn, a structural indeterminacy reconcilia-
tion issue would not involve a challenge to the agency’s definition of
“vehicle.” Instead, imagine that another, arguably related, provision
of the code defines “vehicle.” The interpretive question might be
whether the legislature intended for that definition to be applicable
to the no-vehicles-in-the-park provision. The question would involve
a reconciliation of the two relevant provisions as opposed to an at-
tempt (as in a semantic indeterminacy scenario) to determine the
meaning of “vehicle.” Consider, instead, a literal meaning mandator-
iness issue. Imagine that the agency believes that the no-vehicles-
in-the-park provision should not cover any emergency vehicles, such
as ambulances and police cars. In such a situation, the interpretive
issue does not involve the meaning of “vehicle,” but, rather, whether
the provision must be given its literal meaning.225
223. Justice Kavanaugh proposes that courts distinguish between statutes with broad and
open-ended terms, where courts should generally give agencies the discretion to make policy
judgments, and statutes with specific terms or phrases, where courts should determine
whether the agency’s interpretation is the best reading of the statutory text. See Kavanaugh,
supra note 13, at 2153-54. Perhaps Justice Kavanaugh is referring to a distinction between
generality and polysemy, or, less likely, between semantic indeterminacy resolution and
structural indeterminacy reconciliation. See supra notes 95-119 and accompanying text
(explaining the distinctions among the terms). If the former distinction is intended, a broad
versus narrow distinction would likely not be workable considering that the terms “broad” and
“narrow” are contextually valued standards whose meanings are not clear in the context of
administrative statutes. If the former distinction is intended, the proper description is not
“broad” and “narrow” terms (which does not accurately depict the two categories) but, rather,
semantic indeterminacy and structural indeterminacy.
224. Hart, supra note 103, at 607.
225. The interpretive dispute could involve a semantic indeterminacy issue if, for example,
the government argued that the legal meaning of “vehicle” excluded emergency vehicles.
Alternatively, the interpretive question might involve structural indeterminacy resolution if
another provision that exempts emergency vehicles from generally applicable government
rules pertaining to traffic control and enforcement arguably applied to the no-vehicles-in-the-
park provision.
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The above categories represent actual linguistic phenomena, but
their importation to the law necessarily involves certain normative
principles about the proper relationship between courts and agen-
cies.226 Specifically, the groupings reflect the traditional view that
courts are experts at statutory interpretation—which includes de-
termining congressional intent—and agencies are experts at policy-
making—which includes exercising delegated discretion.227 As will
be explained below, the categories thus provide a framework for the
allocation of interpretive authority between courts and agencies on
the basis of their respective areas of expertise.228 Furthermore, the
distinctions represented by the categories are reflected in various
Supreme Court decisions, although the Court has consistently (and
confusingly) treated the issues as though they fall under the am-
biguity concept.229
The current undifferentiated judicial approach to linguistic inde-
terminacy ignores the probabilities of legislative delegation. Unlike
the case with most efficient nonlegal communication, the legislature
sometimes intends by lexical indeterminacy to signal delegation to
a third party (in other words, an agency) to determine the meaning
of a provision.230 Courts do not, however, typically inquire into the
type of linguistic indeterminacy involved as a way of gauging
congressional intent to delegate.231 Other kinds of indeterminacy,
such as syntactic ambiguity, may not typically signal the intent to
delegate interpretive authority to the relevant agency.232 These
226. See supra notes 93-124 and accompanying text (describing the linguistic phenomena
that result in indeterminacy).
227. Cf. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 530 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Chevron framework thus accounts for the different institutional
competencies of agencies and courts: Courts are expert at statutory construction, while
agencies are expert at statutory implementation. That the distinction can be subtle does not
lessen its importance.”). 
228. See id.
229. See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text (describing the umbrella ambiguity
concept).
230. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 68, at 997 (describing the view of legislative
drafters that “one reason for statutory ambiguity is a desire to delegate decisionmaking to
agencies”).
231. One arguable exception is the “major questions” doctrine, although the doctrine does
not describe a linguistic phenomenon but rather covers issues deemed to be of exceptional
importance to the legislative design. See infra notes 378-80 and accompanying text (describing
the major questions doctrine).
232. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (describing syntactic ambiguity).
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kinds of indeterminacy may reflect, instead, a failure of the leg-
islature to clearly express its intent. Yet, without regard to the type
of indeterminacy at issue, a reviewing court, in Step One, is to as-
sume that Congress decided the interpretive issue and retain that
assumption until some unspecified point in the interpretive process
when it determines that the provision is ambiguous.233
The nature of much of the language in regulatory texts under-
scores the need for judges to inquire into the type of indeterminacy
involved as a way of gauging congressional intent to delegate. Many
of the key expressions in regulatory statutes do not exist outside of
the regulatory environment (for example, “major stationary source”
in Chevron).234 In such situations, the words may lack ordinary
meanings or recognized technical meanings, making the determina-
tion of meaning less an empirical matter and more a matter of
policy consideration.235 Furthermore, in these cases, the indetermi-
nacy may not be readily resolvable through the consideration of
context. This is especially true when the indeterminancy involves
vagueness or contextually valued standards.236 Vagueness and con-
textually valued standards do not involve a choice between two
discreet meanings.237 This problem is exacerbated by the precision
required in legal disputes. Legal texts may be drafted with greater
explicitness than exists in most nonlegal communications, but legal
language is nevertheless often indeterminate, at least relative to the
needs of the legal system.238 Scholars have observed that speakers
and hearers mean “approximately” the same thing by the same
233. Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 559-71 (2009)
(describing the mistaken assumption underlying Chevron that courts should interpret
statutes as if Congress intended that text to have a relatively specific meaning).
234. In nonlegal communication, ambiguity is a trade-off between the two communicative
pressures of clarity and ease, with more frequent words being more ambiguous. This trade-off
is not possible if the words being used cannot be easily interpreted (as is the case in the
administrative context). Cf. Molly Lewis et al., The Structure of the Lexicon Reflects Principles
of Communication, 36 PROC. ANN. MEETING COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 845, 845 (2014) (“[A]
regularity in the lexicon [is] that more complex ideas tend to be named by longer words.”).
235. Cf. Rohde et al., supra note 189, at 114 (“Speakers also experience difficulty ... when
describing objects which ... are unfamiliar or lack a name.”).
236. See supra notes 100-24 and accompanying text (describing vagueness and contextually
valued standards).
237. See supra notes 100-24 and accompanying text.
238. See SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 118-19 (discussing the precision required of answers
to interpretive questions in law compared to most nonlegal communication).
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words, “and [ ] that is all that matters for practical purposes.”239 Yet,
legal cases require binary and precise answers to interpretive dis-
putes (for example, is a Segway a vehicle), and approximateness is
insufficient.240 Interpretation must therefore often yield precise an-
swers to questions the enacting legislature did not likely consider.
In addition to acknowledging a broader range of linguistic phen-
omena relevant to judicial review, courts should eliminate the am-
biguity trigger, which does not serve to coherently mediate between
judicial and agency interpretation. Instead, courts should engage in
statutory interpretation and agencies in exercising delegated powers
in statutory implementation. With any interpretive dispute, a
reviewing court must determine whether the provision has a
mandatory semantic meaning, which is determined by precedent, or
the ordinary or technical meaning of the provision’s language. If
there is no mandatory semantic meaning, and an issue of semantic
indeterminacy is at issue, the court should presume that the
agency’s construction of the provision is correct. The presumption of
correctness may be rebutted through the court’s consideration of the
available pragmatic or semantic evidence and a subsequent con-
clusion that the agency’s interpretation conflicts with the legisla-
tive design.241
In contrast, if structural indeterminacy is at issue, the court
should assume that the issue is judicially decidable through a con-
sideration of legislative design. If multiple meanings are consistent
with the legislative design, the agency’s interpretation, especially if
based on expertise, may be influential in resolving the indetermi-
nacy.242 Similarly, it is judicially decidable whether the literal mean-
ing of a provision is consistent with the overall legislative design. If
so, an agency’s interpretation may not deviate from the literal
239. Timothy Williamson, Vagueness, Indeterminacy, and Social Meaning, 16 CRITICAL
STUD. 61, 73 (2001).
240. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
241. Congress, like speakers outside of the law, signals its intent in a variety of ways. See
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 68, at 994 (indicating that their study “suggests that Congress
often uses extratextual signals as well” as textual signals of intent).
242. Even if the legislative design indicates that a particular interpretation is more
consistent with congressional intent, a reviewing court may nevertheless select a different
interpretation for various reasons specific to the law, such as the applicability of a substantive
canon of interpretation. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701-02 (2001) (creating a
doctrinal limitation to an immigration detention provision in order to avoid a serious consti-
tutional issue).
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meaning of the provision and, if not, the agency’s interpretation
must deviate from the literal meaning of the provision. Thus, in all
of the situations described above, the category implicated by the
interpretive dispute should direct the reviewing court’s approach to
the interpretive question and its attitude towards the agency’s
resolution of it.
B. Semantic Indeterminacy Resolution
Chevron itself involved an issue of semantic indeterminacy.
“Congress enacted certain requirements applicable to States that
had not achieved the national air quality standards established by
the Environmental Protection Agency ... pursuant to earlier legisla-
tion. The amended Clean Air Act required these nonattainment
States to establish a permit program regulating new or modified
major stationary sources of air pollution.”243 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulation at issue “allo[wed] a State to
adopt a plantwide definition of the term ‘stationary source.’”244 The
plantwide definition, the so-called “bubble” concept, authorized an
existing plant “contain[ing] several pollution-emitting devices [to]
install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit
conditions if the alteration [would] not increase the total emissions
from the plant.”245 The D.C. Circuit, in striking down the regulation,
relied on pragmatic evidence.246 Illustrating the judicial decidability
of most interpretive issues, the court indicated that the legislative
history was “at best contradictory,” but relied on the purpose of the
statute and reasoned that the bubble concept was “inappropriate”
in programs enacted to improve air quality.247
Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s decision (which was reversed
by the Supreme Court),248 several aspects of Chevron make it a
243. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40 (1984). The
relevant provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c), provided: “The plan provisions ... required [by subsec-
tion (a)] ... shall require permits for the construction and operation of new or modified major
stationary sources ... in accordance with section 7503 [relating to permit requirements].” 42
U.S.C. §§ 7502(c), (c)(5) (2012).
244. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 841 (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (1982)).
247. Id. at 841-42 (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, 685 F.2d at 726 n.39).
248. See id. at 842.
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paradigmatic example of a situation where there is indeterminacy
that should be presumptively for the agency to resolve. The indeter-
minacy could be said to involve multi-dimensional polysemy because
it is unclear what features are aspects of the lexical meaning of
“major stationary source.”249 In order to reject the agency’s interpre-
tation, a reviewing court must of course give some meaning to “ma-
jor stationary source” that would exclude the agency’s “bubble”
concept as not falling within the possible boundaries of the con-
cept.250 If precedent does not determine the meaning of the relevant
statutory language, the presumption is that it should be given its
“ordinary meaning.”251 Considering that judicial reliance on dic-
tionaries has dramatically increased since 1987, a court might
approach the ordinary meaning of “major stationary source” by con-
sulting dictionary definitions.252 If the court adheres to the classical
theory of meaning (as is likely), it will assume that a dictionary def-
inition describes a category with a set of properties (i.e., “defining
attributes”) in which each attribute is singly necessary for category
membership, and possession of the set of attributes is sufficient for
category membership.253 “[T]he parameters of the concept’s exten-
sion (i.e., its referential range of application) are [thus] always
capable of being determined with precision.”254 In this way “the
meaning of a word consists of a set of properties that can be used as
a sort of decision procedure to identify all and only the things
denoted by the word.”255 A court could therefore consult dictionary
definitions of “stationary” and “source,” combine the two in some
249. Id. at 840; see supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (describing multi-
dimensional polysemy).
250. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 860-62.
251. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012) (“When a term goes
undefined in a statute, [the Court] give[s] the term its ordinary meaning.”). If the language
has an established common law meaning, the interpretive dispute may turn on whether the
statutory term must be given its common law meaning.
252. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840; see James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage:
The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483, 486, 495 (2013) (explaining that, while the United States Supreme Court’s
use of dictionaries was virtually non-existent before 1987, now as many as one-third of
statutory decisions cite dictionary definitions).
253. See SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 221-22 (“By averring that words in legal texts can be
defined by necessary and sufficient criteria, judges can avoid alternative views of meaning
that complicate and undermine the classical theory.”).
254. Id. at 222.
255. Id. at 221-22.
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manner, and treat the dictionary definitions as setting forth
necessary and sufficient conditions for membership within the “ma-
jor stationary source” concept.256
The above approach, though, is deeply flawed. One issue is that
the practice of determining word meanings through dictionary def-
initions is problematic due to the acontextual nature of dictionary
definitions, which present words more or less individually in an
“accessible list.”257 More importantly, viewing most definitions as
providing necessary and sufficient conditions of meaning has been
thoroughly undermined by prototype theory.258 By the 1970s, the
classical view of categorization began suffering sustained criti-
cisms.259 In particular, researchers rejected the view that category
membership involves a set of necessary attributes that are jointly
sufficient to delimit the category in contrast with others.260 These
researchers offered as alternatives to the classical view psycholin-
guistic theories of how people perceive categories.261 In contrast to
the traditional view, many words are not defined by people in terms
of a list of necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied
for a thing to count as a member of the relevant category.262 Instead,
they have prototypical structures that cannot be defined by means
of a single set of criterial (i.e., necessary and sufficient) attributes,
and blurring occurs at the edges of the category.263 Category mem-
bership is thus seen as being a matter of degree, rather than simply
a yes-or-no question.264 Such a view of word definitions poses ob-
vious problems for legal interpretation, which in general relies on
256. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. The statute defined “major” as a source that “must emit at
least 100 tons of pollution to qualify.” Id.
257. See M. A. K. HALLIDAY & COLIN YALLOP, LEXICOLOGY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 24-25
(2007).
258. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETA-
TION 62-63 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2010).
259. See id. at 62-64. Even before the 1970s, philosophers like Wittgenstein undermined
the classical theory of meaning and the mental structures underlying it. See, e.g., LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
1968).
260. See, e.g., SOLAN, supra note 258, at 63.
261. See id. at 62-65.
262. See id. at 63.
263. See id. at 63-64.
264. See Zhang, supra note 105, at 16 (“Category membership is not simply a yes-or-no
question, but rather, a matter of degree. Different individuals may have different category-
rankings depending on their experiences, their world knowledge, and their beliefs.”).
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bivalency (i.e., the idea that interpretative questions have “yes” or
“no” answers).265
Two other factors, especially pertinent in the administrative
state, should similarly counsel against judicial efforts to assertively
define word categories. The first is that terms in legal texts often
refer to intangible concepts that either do not exist outside of the
law (such as “major stationary source”)266 or exist at too high a level
of generality compared to the needs of the legal profession. These
terms often do not refer to natural kinds (i.e., categories of things,
such as “pigeon,” “that occur naturally in the world without need for
human intervention”), which might lend themselves to technical
definitions or ordinary meanings that have at least prototypical
examples.267 Tangible artefactual kinds (i.e., “categor[ies] based on
a particular human relationship to some natural things”) might
similarly at least have readily discernable ordinary meanings.268 In
contrast, “major stationary source,”269 unlike familiar statutory
terms such as “vehicle” and “fruit,” is not a phrase that is used out-
side of the law, which undermines the notion that it has an ordinary
meaning.270 Even if a judicially created definition were possible, it
would nevertheless not preclude problems of indeterminacy due to
the possibility of vagueness, generality, or some other form of inde-
terminacy.271
The second factor counseling against judicial assertiveness is
that defining a complex concept, such as “major stationary
source,”272 is not a situation where the separate concepts can simply
be combined in a straightforward manner to form the complex
concept. The definitional issue is especially acute for intangible
concepts, such as “major stationary source,” that do not exist out-
side of the law.273 Conceptual combination is often illustrated using
265. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
266. See id.
267. See MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 104, at 110.
268. See id.
269. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
270. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25-27 (1931) (determining that an “air-
plane[ ]” is not a “vehicle”); Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (determining that
“tomatoes” are “vegetables” and not “fruit”).
271. See supra notes 88-124 and accompanying text (describing the various forms of
indeterminacy).
272. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
273. See id.
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the “pet fish” example.274 Something is a “pet fish” if it is both a
“pet” and a “fish.”275 One might think that something is a stereotypi-
cal pet fish if it is a stereotypical pet and a stereotypical fish.276 The
problem, though, is that “a good example of a pet fish” (perhaps, a
guppy) “is neither a prototypical pet” (some breed of dog) nor a
prototypical fish (perhaps, a trout).277 The example raises the issue
of whether the two concepts, “pet” and “fish,” can be combined in a
straightforward way in order to create a complex concept that
inherits the stereotypes of the constituents.278 The pet fish problem
illustrates that complex concepts require some theory as to how one
can expect the separate concepts, each with its own prototype
structure, to combine. Any such theories, though, do not offer
algorithms and depend on the interpreter’s knowledge and judge-
ment of the world.279
As the above discussion indicates, giving determinate meanings
to statutory terms in administrative cases should be viewed as chal-
lenging due to the prototypical nature of categories, the intangible
nature of the concepts (which often do not exist outside of the law),
and the difficulties associated with determining how the constituent
concepts of complex concepts should combine. In light of these
issues, the Court in Chevron properly recognized that the meaning
of the relevant statutory provision was indeterminate.280 The Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, which were at issue in the case, did
not specifically define “major stationary source.”281 Other provisions
in the Clean Air Act did define the concept, but, in the Court’s
opinion, not precisely enough to resolve the interpretive issue.282
Thus, the Court was left to determine the features of the “major
274. See Andrew C. Connolly, Jerry A. Fodor, Lila R. Gleitman, & Henry Gleitman, Why
Stereotypes Don’t Even Make Good Defaults, 103 COGNITION 1, 5 (2007).
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. (“There is a prima facie problem about how to reconcile the stereotype theory
of concepts with the compositionality constraint.”).
278. See id.
279. See SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 251 (“One important source of information, world
knowledge, has a greatly attenuated relevance when a complex concept that does not exist
outside of the law is at issue.”).
280. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851 (1984).
281. See id.
282. See id. at 851, 860 (explaining that the definition “sheds virtually no light on the
meaning of the term ‘stationary source’”).
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stationary source” category on its own, and wisely determined that
it could not do so on the basis of semantic meaning.283 Of course, the
Court did not explicitly consider the interpretive difficulties ex-
plained above, but it did realize it was not in a position to declare
that “major stationary source,” as a general matter, had a determi-
nate meaning—either because of its ordinary meaning or because of
the definitions Congress provided—that could resolve the interpre-
tive issue before the Court.284
Although the Court’s Chevron opinion famously created more
uncertainty about judicial review than it resolved, the case is con-
sistent with the theory that interpretive questions involving
semantic indeterminacy should presumptively be decided by the
agency.285 The semantic meaning of “major stationary source”286 is
indeterminate, but such a determination should not conclude the
interpretive process. Rather, the presumption can be rebutted by
either semantic or pragmatic evidence. The presumption may be
overcome on semantic grounds on the basis that even though words
generally cannot be defined by means of a single set of criterial
attributes, the agency’s interpretation may clearly fall outside any
plausible meaning of the term at issue. Imagine, for example, that
the EPA adopted an expanded version of the “bubble” concept that
provided that “major stationary source” could cover all of the fac-
tories a company owned.287 Thus, the company could construct a
pollution emitting device without obtaining a permit if it reduced
emissions at one of its other plants, perhaps located far away from
the plant at issue. In such a situation the reviewing court might
well determine that even considering the presumption of agency
resolution and the problems associated with determinate definitions
described above, the meaning of “major stationary source”288 must
necessarily exclude the agency’s interpretation.
As indicated above, the presumption of judicial undecidability
might also be rebutted on the basis of pragmatic evidence indicating
283. See id. at 840, 861-62. The Court did not use the term “semantic meaning,” of course.
284. See id. at 840, 862.
285. See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between
semantics and pragmatics).
286. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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that some particular meaning was preferred or rejected. There may
be, for example, an indication in the legislative history that Con-
gress had considered and rejected the very interpretation the agency
has adopted.289 The interpretation may also be rejected by more
indirect inferences about congressional intent. Perhaps the agency’s
interpretation is incompatible with related provisions, thereby
indicating ex-ante congressional disapproval of the agency’s inter-
pretation.290 Similarly, the agency’s interpretation may be incom-
patible with judicial precedents interpreting a related provision.
The presumption of agency resolution of semantic indetermi-
nacy thus reflects the institutional competencies of agencies and
courts.291 If courts are experts at statutory interpretation and
agencies statutory implementation, issues of semantic indetermi-
nacy should not be considered matters of prototypical statutory
interpretation. Currently, under Chevron, issues of statutory im-
plementation are not identified ex-ante but rather only after a com-
prehensive process of statutory interpretation has been conducted
(i.e., the traditional ambiguity analysis).292 The division of institu-
tional competencies is thus muddled and contingent on the judge’s
personal predilections regarding the determination of ambiguity. In
the administrative state, though, issues of semantic indeterminacy
present situations where epistemic certainty regarding the interpre-
tive question should be presumed unlikely. In such situations, the
interpretation chosen by the agency can be ex-ante seen as statutory
289. Obviously, if the reviewing court is unwilling to consider legislative history, as some
are, that source of pragmatic meaning will be unavailable. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 351-52 (1994).
290. Statutes and provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. See Michael
Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” One to Seven, 50 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 973-74 (2006). Thus, “[i]f there is uncertainty as to the meaning of a word
in a particular statute, one might look to its use in another statute on the same subject matter
for guidance” on the basis that “among statutes in pari materia, one can reasonably expect
similar uses, especially if they are part of an intentionally coherent scheme.” Id. at 976-77.
291. Arguably, agencies have an institutional advantage over courts in ascertaining
legislative intent. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 209-10 (2006) (arguing that agencies may be better at
determining legislative intent than judges due to agencies’ greater political responsiveness).
Even if true, it is the judicial function to determine legislative intent and ensure that the
agency is not acting outside the bounds of its statutory authority. 
292. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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implementation, with statutory interpretation by the court cancel-
ling the agency’s meaning possible but presumptively unavailable.293
C. Structural Indeterminacy Reconciliation
If judicial review is to be structured on the basis of institutional
competencies and semantic indeterminacy signals a presumptive
area for agency authority, then issues involving structural indeter-
minacy should signal an area for judicial interpretive primacy.
Structural indeterminacy reconciliation involves determining the
relationship between sentences or phrases within the provision at
issue or between the provision at issue and some other determinant
of meaning, such as a related provision or some other statute.294
Considering that the judiciary has institutional primacy in matters
of interpretation, an issue of possible structural indeterminacy
should be considered a matter of prototypical statutory construction
for the reviewing court to resolve.295 Unlike the case with semantic
indeterminacy, an issue of possible structural indeterminacy pri-
marily and necessarily involves an assessment of legislative de-
sign, and hence congressional intent. The issue raised by the
interpretive dispute should be seen as judicially decidable on the
basis of the traditional materials that courts consider when
interpreting statutes, such as precedents, legislative history, and
inferences from related provisions. In contrast to the current
Chevron doctrine, though, where the ambiguity concept allocates
interpretive responsibility, courts should ex-ante indicate that the
293. The distinction is somewhat similar to that between interpretation and construction.
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
95, 96 (2010) (explaining that “interpretation ... is the process (or activity) that recognizes or
discovers the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the legal text” while “construction ...
is the “process that gives a text legal effect (either [b]y translating the linguistic meaning into
legal doctrine or by applying or implementing the text)”).
294. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
295. The principle that courts have primacy in matters of statutory interpretation is well-
accepted, although contestable. See Eskridge, supra note 30, at 414-16 (arguing that agencies
should be given primacy in matters of statutory interpretation). Even those scholars arguing
for agency primacy agree that courts are the final authority in determining legislative intent.
See id. at 449 (arguing that courts in Step One should “pay close attention to the agency’s
reasoning”). While paying “close attention” to an agency’s reasoning seems like a wise course
of action in virtually all circumstances, it would be a dangerous shifting of power (well beyond
what Chevron provides) for a court to defer to an agency’s views of legislative intent.
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interpretive issue is one of possible structural indeterminacy rather
than waiting until the end of the interpretive process to make the
announcement about interpretive authority.
1. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
The Court’s decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,296 offers a good
example of structural indeterminacy resolution. The case required
the Court to review an INS determination that two related provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“Act”) with different
terms nevertheless required the same level of proof from appli-
cants.297 One provision of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), “require[d] the
Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien who demon-
strate[d] that his ‘life or freedom would be threatened’” thereby on
account of specified factors.298 The “would be threatened” language
required that the alien demonstrate that “‘it is more likely than not
that the alien would be subject to persecution’ in the country to
which he would be returned.”299 In turn, § 208(a) of the Act autho-
rized the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to a
“refugee,” who, under § 1101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, is unable or
unwilling to return to his home country “because of persecution or
a well-founded fear” thereof on account of particular factors.300 The
agency held that the § 1253(h) “more likely than not” proof stan-
dard applied to § 208(a) asylum claims.301 The Court, though,
rejected the agency’s interpretation on the basis of the differing
language of the two provisions and various indications from the
legislative history.302
Justice Stevens (the author of the Chevron opinion), writing for
the Court, reasoned that because the nature of the interpretive
296. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
297. See id. at 423.
298. See id.
299. Id. (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984)).
300. Id. Section 1101(a)(42) provides that “[t]he term ‘refugee’ does not include any person
who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
301. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433.
302. See id. at 432 (“The message conveyed by the plain language of the Act is confirmed
by an examination of its history.”).
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issue was per se for judicial, not agency, resolution, indicating that
“[t]he question whether Congress intended the two standards to be
identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts
to decide.”303 Justice Stevens contrasted a “pure question of statu-
tory construction” (constituting a “narrow legal question”), where
the agency’s interpretation would not receive deference, with an
applied question (involving the agency giving “concrete meaning” to
a term “through a process of case-by-case adjudication”), where the
agency’s interpretation would receive deference.304 The Court thus
“[e]mploy[ed] traditional tools of statutory construction” and “con-
cluded that Congress did not intend the two standards to be
identical.”305
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia observed that the Court’s
distinction was “contradicted by the case the Court purports to be
interpreting, since in Chevron the Court deferred to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s abstract interpretation of the phrase
‘stationary source.’”306 Having rejected the pure versus applied dis-
tinction (at least as framed by the Court), Justice Scalia argued that
there was no basis for declaring the interpretive issue to be judici-
ally decidable, characterizing the Court’s position as indicating that
reviewing “courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for
that of an agency whenever, ‘[e]mploying traditional tools of
statutory construction,’ they are able to reach a conclusion as to the
proper interpretation of the statute.”307 In Justice Scalia’s view, the
Court’s approach “would make deference a doctrine of desperation,
authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable
to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but
an evisceration of Chevron.”308 Justice Scalia did not indicate, how-
ever, how a reviewing court should determine which interpretive
issues are judicially decidable and which are not.309
303. Id. at 446; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say
What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2604 (2006) (“Taken on its face, Cardoza-Fonseca seems
to be an effort to restore the pre-Chevron status quo by asserting the primacy of the judiciary
on purely legal questions.”).
304. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446, 448.
305. Id. at 446.
306. Id. at 455 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
307. Id. at 454.
308. Id. at 454.
309. In a later article, Justice Scalia stated that “[i]f Chevron is to have any meaning, then,
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Justice Scalia is correct that the Cardoza-Fonseca case is difficult
to reconcile with Chevron if the pure versus applied framework is
applied to the cases, but viewing the distinction between Cardoza-
Fonseca and Chevron as turning on the type of legal indeterminacy
presented provides the proper foundation for the difference in
treatment. In contrast to Chevron, Cardoza-Fonseca did not involve
an issue of semantic indeterminacy. Ultimately, of course, the agen-
cy was attempting to determine the meaning of “refugee,” but the
case did not involve the agency’s definitional efforts.310 Reviewing
courts were not required to consider the agency’s definition of “ref-
ugee,” but, rather, decide whether two provisions with different
terms nevertheless established the same standard of review.311 The
Court did reference “ordinary meaning” in its decision when explain-
ing why one can have a “well-founded” fear of something even when
there is less than a 50 percent chance of its occurrence.312 Consider-
ation of “ordinary meaning” in such a case should not be surprising,
though. When reconciling statutory provisions, a reviewing court
may naturally consider semantic evidence relating to the language
of each provision.313 After all, the court must determine the
relationship between the two provisions. The Court’s consideration
of ordinary meaning does not indicate that the real issue in
Cardoza-Fonseca was one of semantic indeterminacy but instead
congressional intent must be regarded as ‘ambiguous’ not just when no interpretation is even
marginally better than any other, but rather when two or more reasonable, though not
necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist.” See Scalia, supra note 40, at 520. Justice
Scalia also indicated, though, that “[i]t is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me
to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.” Id. at
521. Considering Justice Scalia’s later statement, there would seem to be only a slight
difference between the majority’s presumption that “pure questions” are judicially decidable
and Justice Scalia’s position that under Chevron it is rare that he would be forced to defer to
an interpretation with which he did not agree. In any case, Justice Scalia’s reference to “two
or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally valid, interpretations” is simply a
reference to a typical way in which ambiguity is defined by the judiciary (along with a
conflation of ambiguity identification and disambiguation). Id. at 520. As such, it does not
offer any special insight into the determination of ambiguity.
310. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 431 (indicating that the “ordinary and obvious meaning of [well-founded] is
not to be lightly discounted”).
313. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962) (“[W]e must, of course, start
with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used.”).
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illustrates that linguistic analysis of the relevant language is inev-
itable when resolving interpretive disputes regarding the meaning
of statutory language.
The line between constructing meaning (i.e., semantic indeter-
minacy) and resolving (potentially) conflicting indications of legis-
lative intent may not always be distinct, but as the Chevron and
Cardoza-Fonseca cases illustrate, the two categories are coherent.
Unlike the pure versus applied distinction, the difference between
semantic and structural indeterminacy provides a workable frame-
work for mediating between judicial statutory interpretation and
agency statutory implementation. When the issue is one of semantic
indeterminacy, the presumption should be that it is one for the
agency to resolve, as long as the word or phrase at issue does not
have some meaning (ordinary or technical) that resolves the issue.
Conversely, when the issue is one of structural indeterminacy,
which typically involves reconciling various statutory provisions,
there should be a presumption that the reviewing court can discern
congressional intent using traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion. Still, there is no claim here that the distinction between sem-
antic and structural indeterminacy can generally account (even if
implicitly) for the Court’s decisions regarding deference to agency
interpretations, even if the distinction offers a way to reconcile
Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca. Undoubtedly, in various cases the
Court has cited to Chevron even when the interpretive dispute
involves structural indeterminacy.314 Yet, as discussed below, there
is some support on the Court that Chevron should not be applied in
at least some cases involving structural indeterminacy.
2. Mixed Cases of Semantic Indeterminacy Resolution and
Structural Indeterminacy Reconciliation
As this Article argues, courts should presume that agency reso-
lution of semantic indeterminacy is correct and independently re-
solve structural indeterminacy; however, interpretive disputes may
involve both semantic indeterminacy and structural indeterminacy.
314. Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osori, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014), as discussed in the next section,
is an example where the plurality opinion explicitly indicated that Chevron deference should
apply to issues involving structural indeterminacy.
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Even in such cases, the principles underlying how interpretive
authority should be allocated between courts and agencies support
judicial deference to the agency’s resolution of any semantic inde-
terminacy, but not its resolution of structural indeterminacy. Scia-
labba v. Cuellar De Osori provides a good example of an interpretive
dispute that involves both semantic and structural indeterminacy,
as well as disagreement about the application of Chevron to certain
disputes regarding structural indeterminacy.315 The interpretive
dispute centered on immigrant visas and a provision, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(h)(3), of the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA).316 The con-
text involved the family-preference system which allows citizens and
lawful permanent residents to “petition for certain family mem-
bers—spouses, siblings, and children of various ages—to obtain
immigrant visas.”317 Such a sponsored individual is known as the
petitioner’s “principal beneficiary.”318 A principal beneficiary’s un-
married child under the age of twenty-one qualifies as a “derivative
beneficiary” and is “entitled to the same [immigration] status” and
“order of consideration” as the principal beneficiary.319 The bene-
ficiaries are eligible to apply for visas in order of “priority date,”
which is set by the date the petition is filed.320
The problem is that the immigration process may take many
years to complete, due to a combination of slow government pro-
cessing and the limited number of visas available each year.321 As a
result, the derivative beneficiaries may “age out” and lose their
immigration status before a visa becomes available.322 Congress’s
response to the aging out problem, § 1153(h)(3), provides as follows:
If the age of an alien is determined ... to be 21 years of age or
older ..., the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to
315. Id.
316. Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151,
1153-54, 1157-58 (2012)).
317. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2196.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 2198.
321. See id. at 2196.
322. Id.
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the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original
priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.323
The broad interpretive question was whether the provision grants
a remedy of some kind to all aliens who have aged out or, instead,
as the government argued, only to those aliens who can be seam-
lessly converted from one family preference category to another
without the need for a new sponsor.324 Thus, for example, under the
government’s interpretation, if the original principal beneficiary
was the sibling of a U.S. citizen, the principal beneficiary’s child
(originally a derivative beneficiary) who had aged out would not be
eligible for relief because a niece or nephew does not qualify as a
principal beneficiary and the now adult child would need a new
sponsor.325
The potential semantic indeterminacy came from the phrase
“automatically be converted.”326 Section 1153(h)(3) does not ex-
plicitly state which petitions qualify for automatic conversion and
retention of priority dates, referencing only “the appropriate cate-
gory.”327 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) argued that there
was no semantic indeterminacy because the phrase “automatic
conversion” has a “recognized meaning” within immigration law.328
In the government’s view, the phrase applies only “when a petition
[can] move seamlessly from one family preference category to an-
other [but] not when a new sponsor [is] needed to fit a beneficiary
into a different category.”329 Through a survey of other immigration
provisions (as well as, oddly, dictionary definitions), the Court
concluded that the “exclusive way immigration law” uses the phrase
is only when it entails “nothing more than picking up the petition
from one category and dropping it into another for which the alien
now qualified.”330
In comparison to the meaning of the automatic conversion lan-
guage, the structural indeterminacy in § 1153(h)(3) could not be as
323. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012).
324. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2201.
325. See id. at 2202.
326. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(I)(3) (2012).
327. Id.
328. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2201.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 2204.
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easily resolved (in the view of the plurality, at least). The plurality
reasoned that the provision “does not speak unambiguously to the
issue” because it is “Janus-faced.”331 The “first half [of § 1153(h)(3)]
looks in one direction, toward ... sweeping relief [for an alien 21
years of age or older], which would reach every aged-out beneficiary
of a family preference petition.”332 In contrast, the “second half looks
another way, toward a remedy that can apply to only a subset of
those beneficiaries.”333 The plurality opinion indicated that “[r]ead
either most naturally, and the other appears to mean not what it
says. That internal tension makes possible alternative reasonable
constructions, bringing into correspondence in one way or another
the section’s different parts.”334 The plurality, along with Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justice Scalia concurring in the judgment, resolved
the internal tension in favor of the reading that would grant relief
only for those aliens who can seamlessly convert from one family
preference category to another without the need for a new spon-
sor.335 In contrast, Justice Sotomayor in a dissenting opinion, joined
by Justices Breyer and Thomas, argued that the plurality was
incorrect in its interpretation of “automatic” and “that § 1153(h)(3)
permits an aged-out child to retain her original priority date [even]
if her petition cannot be automatically converted” in the manner
described by the plurality.336
The plurality, indicating that “[t]his is the kind of case Chevron
was built for,”337 concluded that §1153(h)(3) “permits” but does not
require the BIA’s “decision to so distinguish among aged-out bene-
ficiaries.”338 The plurality reasoned that when “possible alternative
reasonable constructions, bringing into correspondence in one way
or another the section’s different parts” exist, “Chevron dictates that
a court defer to the agency’s choice—here, to the Board’s expert
judgment about which interpretation fits best with, and makes most
sense of, the statutory scheme.”339 The concurring Justices (along
331. Id. at 2203.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See id. at 2206; see also id. at 2214-15 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
336. See id. at 2221-23 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 2213 (plurality opinion).
338. Id. at 2207.
339. Id. at 2203.
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with Justice Alito in a dissenting opinion),340 though, disagreed that
Chevron applied, arguing that
when Congress assigns to an agency the responsibility for de-
ciding whether a particular group should get relief, it does not
do so by simultaneously saying that the group should and that
it should not. Direct conflict is not ambiguity, and the resolution
of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legislative
choice. Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute
that does not make sense.341
In the view of the concurring Justices, there was “no conflict, or
even ‘internal tension’” within § 1153(h)(3) because the second,
limiting clause is the “only operative provision.”342
Making sense of statutory schemes and resolving possible struc-
tural conflicts is, of course, statutory interpretation (as illustrated
by the plurality opinion) designed to determine the “legislative
choice.”343 Despite the odd phrasing, the argument made by the
concurring Justices that “[d]irect conflict is not ambiguity, and the
resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legis-
lative choice” is effectively treating “ambiguity” as a legal doctrine,
shorn of linguistic significance, which represents a judicial determi-
nation that the interpretive issue involves congressional delegation
to the relevant agency.344 Thus, at least some types of structural in-
determinacy are judicially decidable on the basis of an assessment
of the legislative design, and are thus not situations involving
ambiguity for an agency to resolve.345 If Chevron is viewed as a
doctrine of judicial self-restraint, determining legislative choice
through an evaluation of the legislative design does not implicate
340. See id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
342. Id. at 2214-15.
343. See id. at 2214. The plurality noted that Chevron deference was appropriate in part
because of the agency’s expertise. See id. at 2203 (plurality opinion). But a court can take
account of agency expertise without formal deference being given to the agency. In fact, the
expertise agencies possess may sometimes be exceeded by that of business, trade associations,
nonprofits, think tanks, and others, thus underscoring the notion that expertise, by itself,
cannot justify deference. See Stephen M. Johnson, Advancing Auer in an Era of Retreat, 41
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 551, 562 n.82 (2017).
344. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
345. See id.
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the reasons for allocating primary interpretive authority to the
agency.346 Even so, as the plurality opinion indicated, the Court may
conclude in some cases that the structural issues render the statute
indeterminate.347 In these situations, the agency’s views on the
proper interpretation, if based on expertise, may be relevant to the
resolution of the indeterminacy.
D. Literal Meaning Mandatoriness
1. The Judicial Decidability of Interpretive Issues Involving
Literal Meaning
The semantic and structural indeterminacy categories cover a
wide range of interpretive issues relevant to legal cases, but the
separate linguistic phenomenon of literalness has also presented
difficult issues related to deference that have been particularly con-
troversial in recent years. Of course, like other linguistic categories,
there are various ways to define “literal meaning.” To simplify a bit,
literal meaning can be identified with the linguistic meaning of the
relevant sentence that is conventional and context independent.348
Essentially, then, literal meaning is based on the conventional
meaning of language, which is primarily tied to the semantic mean-
ings of the words.349 In the administrative state, the issue of literal-
ness concerns whether the legal meaning of the provision may or
must deviate from its literal meaning. In part, the issue of liter-
alness is controversial because there is said to be a “clear prefer-
ence” for interpreting language in legal texts according to its literal
meaning.350 Natural “[l]anguage is full of nonliteral meanings, such
346. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that one theory of Chevron is
that it is best viewed as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint).
347. The plurality opinion arguably indicated that the government’s interpretation was
permissible but not mandated, reasoning that “[c]onfronted with a self-contradictory,
ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable
construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies underlying immigration
law.” Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2213.
348. See C.J.L. Talmage, Literal Meaning, Conventional Meaning and First Meaning, 40
ERKENNTNIS 213, 213 (1994).
349. FRANCOIS RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING 3 (2004).
350. Ross Charnock, Hart as Contextualist? Theories of Interpretation in Language and the
Law, in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 128 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith
eds., 2013).
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as metaphors, idioms, slang, and polite talk.”351 “When such expres-
sions are used, the literal meaning of the expression may differ
from” the speaker’s intended meaning.352 Nevertheless, such usages
of language are far less common in legal texts.353 The preference for
literal meaning in law is strong enough that it has been said that
the literal meaning must be applied even in situations where the
drafter may have had a contrary intention.354
It may thus seem as though agency interpretations that deviate
from the literal meaning of the relevant provision should be in-
validated because they are inconsistent with the manner in which
courts interpret statutes. Nevertheless, despite the assertions of
the primacy of literal meaning, the judicial commitment to it is far
from absolute.355 Courts are often motivated for various reasons to
select interpretations that deviate from the literal meanings of the
relevant texts.356 Indeed, a common characteristic of principles of
legal interpretation is that they serve to restrict the domains of
legal texts (that is, their scopes of application), sometimes thereby
creating a gap between literal meaning and legal meaning.357 So-
called substantive canons of interpretation, for instance, derive from
legal considerations, not linguistic ones, and often restrict the scope
of provisions or create exceptions to statutes that are, on their face,
clear.358 Similarly, a court might declare that a defense is available
in a criminal case even though the relevant statute does not ex-
plicitly provide for the defense.359
351. SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 26.
352. See id.
353. See Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory
Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431, 454 (2001) (“[S]poken language abounds in what we can
loosely call nonliteral or figurative usage. It is far less appropriate in an autonomous written
text.”). 
354. See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 110 (1999).
355. See SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 187, 209.
356. See id.
357. See id.; see also David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 925 (1992) (noting that the canons of interpretation often resolve
statutory meaning “in favor of continuity and against change”). 
358. See Shapiro, supra note 357, at 934 (explaining that some substantive canons, “em-
bracing rules of ‘clear statement,’ [are] far more likely to exclude an interpretation that is not
supported by express language”).
359. See, e.g., People v. Khan, 264 N.W.2d 360, 366-67 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (finding an
implied defense of consent in rape cases).
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Even though deviations from literal meaning are common, and
expected by Congress in some situations, an agency interpretation
that deviates from the literal meaning of the relevant text should
not receive deference. This does not mean that such deviations
should always be prohibited. To the contrary, some deviations may
well be consistent with congressional intent. Nevertheless, two fac-
tors counsel against deference. First, the permissibility of nonliter-
al meanings must necessarily be based on non-language, pragmatic
factors such as legislative design and a court’s precedents, which
may allow or prohibit certain deviations. As such, the issue facing
courts is similar to that posed by the structural indeterminacy
category.360 Second, and relatedly, the permissibility of a deviation
from literal meaning is an issue that is easily within the scope of
traditional statutory interpretation and thus decidable by courts.
There is no semantic indeterminacy to address.361 Instead, the
reviewing court must consider whether the literal meaning of the
text must control. The legitimacy of such a deviation is not a matter
of policy but, rather, turns on a judgment about whether the leg-
islative design permits or requires the deviation.362 Thus, notwith-
standing the frequency with which deviations from the literal
meanings of legal texts occur, sanctioning a deviation from con-
gressionally enacted text is a job suited to the judiciary.
The converse of a deviation from literal meaning occurs when an
agency’s adherence to the literal meaning of a provision’s language
is at odds with the overall legislative design. The later issue is often
connected to the issue of generality. Recall that an expression is
general if its meaning is a genus of more than one species, such that
“parent” includes within its scope “mother” and “father.”363 A sen-
tence can be said to be general, or unspecified, to the extent that it
360. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the phenomenon of structural indeterminacy).
361. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the phenomenon of semantic indeterminacy).
362. Sometimes an applicable interpretive principle, such as the constitutional avoidance
canon, could be said to be based on normative principles that are separate from legislative
intent. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2000) (describing the canon of
constitutional avoidance “as a normative canon—a rule designed to push interpretations in
directions that reflect enduring public values”). Nevertheless, reviewing courts determine
whether the interpretive principle applies independently of any agency views on the topic. 
363. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (describing the linguistic notion of
generality).
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does not specify certain details.364 This phenomenon can also be
referred to as “communicative underdeterminacy.”365 In some cases,
the underdeterminacy is relatively easy to identify. For instance,
the statement “‘some event will happen at some time’ is vague in the
lack-of-detail sense.”366 “Both ‘some event’ and ‘some time’ are, for
most purposes, insufficiently informative in a way that needs little
elaboration.”367 “The statement ... represents more than just a cate-
gory with a fuzzy boundary. Rather, the indeterminacy extends
beyond the boundary of [the statement]. If required to provide guid-
ance, [the statement] will require significant nonlanguage-based
precisification.”368
The narrowing of generalities is a common feature of language
comprehension, as many natural language expressions are quite
general.369 Likewise, legal texts are often drafted with high levels of
generality (sometimes alarmingly so), especially when the statute
is to be administered by an agency.370 The generality serves various
legitimate functions, including delegating discretion to the agency
to fill in the details of the statute.371 Yet, as with any legislation, the
enacting legislature is unlikely to have considered many of the
interpretive issues that will arise when the statute must be applied
to specific cases.372 There are various reasons for this neglect, such
as inattention to detail or a desire not to upset legislative compro-
mises, but certainly a significant reason is the inability to foresee all
of the factual scenarios that an agency may claim fall under the
statute.373 Such a scenario is the expected price that must be paid
for enacting legislation that will be applied in the future. Still,
generality can create interpretive problems when an agency takes
some action consistent with the literal meaning of the language, but
the broad, yet literal, meaning may not be consistent with the
364. See Zhang, supra note 105, at 16.
365. See SLOCUM, supra note 44, at 249.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. 
369. See LEVINSON, supra note 195, at 184 (explaining that one theory is that “many
natural language expressions are maximally general, to the point of bordering on vacuity”).
370. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 68, at 996-97.
371. See id.
372. See id. (explaining that “lack of time,” the “complexity of the issue,” and the “need for
consensus” were reasons why statutes were drafted with indeterminacy).
373. See id. 
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legislative design. A reviewing court may therefore be naturally
skeptical that Congress considered, when enacting the legislation,
the problems created by generality.
Considering that an agency’s resolution of semantic indetermi-
nacy should be deemed presumed correct but the determination
whether literal meaning is mandated or prohibited is for judicial
resolution, it is likely that the agency will often claim that its
interpretation is either mandatory or a resolution of semantic inde-
terminacy. In some cases, the interpretive issue may indeed involve
the resolution of semantic indeterminacy rather than literalness. In
other cases, it may be that the agency’s interpretation actually
deviates from the literal meaning of the text but that such deviation
is nonetheless consistent with the legislative design. After determin-
ing that the agency’s interpretation deviates from the literal mean-
ing of the text, the court should independently determine whether
doing so is consistent with the legislative design. The King v.
Burwell case, discussed below, would be such an example.374 Al-
ternatively, the court may determine that the agency’s interpre-
tation does not deviate from the literal meaning of the text but that
certain pragmatic facts should invalidate the agency’s interpre-
tation.375 The Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. case, discussed
below, would be such an example.376 In this scenario, the agency’s
interpretation is invalidated, as it may be in any case involving se-
mantic indeterminacy, by the court’s assessment that the chosen
meaning is inconsistent with the legislative design.377
2. Agency Interpretations that Depart from Literal Meaning
As explained above, when the question is whether a provision can
or should be given a nonliteral meaning, the reviewing court does
not confront semantic indeterminacy but, rather, must decide
whether the nonliteral interpretation is consistent with legislative
design. As such, the issue is similar to structural indeterminacy
374. See 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
375. Because the agency’s interpretation is consistent with the literal meaning of the text,
it is pragmatic evidence, if anything, that would invalidate the interpretation.
376. See 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“[W]e must be guided to a degree by common sense.”).
377. See id.
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(exemplified by Cardoza-Fonseca).378 In both situations, the question
is how to make sense of the statutory design enacted by Congress.
On occasion, the Court has decided cases involving literalness and
addressed the applicability of Chevron deference, but has done so in
an oblique manner.379 Instead of identifying the relevant issue as
being whether the literal meaning of the provision must determine
its legal meaning, considering the context of the statute, the Court
has created a “major questions” exception to Chevron that focuses
on whether the interpretive issue was “extraordinary.”380 The
problem is that what is “extraordinary” is a contextually valued
standard that is unnecessarily indeterminate (what counts as
“extraordinary”?) and purports to set too high of a standard for the
category.381 More importantly, what is “extraordinary” about these
situations is not, as the Court would have it, the importance of the
underlying interpretive issue to the implementation of the relevant
statute but, instead, the possibility that the literal meaning of a
validly enacted statute is being rejected in favor of a nonliteral
meaning. It may not be likely that Congress will have explicitly
addressed deviations from literal meaning, but it is likely that a
determination of these issues can be made on the basis of consider-
ation of legislative design.382
Consider the Court’s recent, and controversial, decision in King
v. Burwell, discussed earlier.383 Recall that the IRS issued a regu-
lation interpreting the ACA as providing for tax credits even in
states that have a federal exchange rather than a state exchange.384
As is its custom, the Court framed the interpretive dispute in terms
of ambiguity, indicating that the key provision, “when read in con-
text,” was “properly viewed as ambiguous.”385 The Court reasoned
378. See supra Part IV.C.1 (describing structural indeterminacy and Cardoza-Fonseca).
379. See generally Jonas J. Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine,
68 ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (2016).
380. See id. at 452.
381. See supra note 120-24 and accompanying text (describing contextually valued,
evaluative standards).
382. See supra note 68 (explaining that legislative drafters feel an obligation to address
major questions).
383. See 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); see also supra notes 45-68 and accompanying text
(discussing King).
384. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed.
Reg. 30378 (2012)).
385. Id. at 2490-91.
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that the phrase “‘an Exchange established by the State’ ... may be
limited in its reach to State Exchanges” but could “also ... refer[ ] to
all Exchanges—both State and Federal—at least for purposes of
the tax credits.”386 The Court’s identification of “ambiguity,” though,
was motivated by the consequences of the alternative interpreta-
tions rather than any ordinary or technical meaning of “State.”387
The Court’s main reasoning was that “[i]f tax credits were not
available on Federal Exchanges,” related “provisions would make
little sense.”388 The Court sought to “avoid the type of calamitous
result that Congress plainly meant to avoid,” and, thus, the Court
indicated that “[i]f at all possible, [it] must interpret the Act in a
way that” improves health insurance markets and does not destroy
them.389
Contrary to the Court’s rhetoric, the language in § 36B was not
“ambiguous,” nor was there semantic indeterminacy with respect to
the interpretive issue before the Court.390 After all, the ACA def-
inition of “State” as meaning “each of the 50 States and the District
of Columbia” was straightforward and clearly excluded the federal
government.391 Neither the IRS nor the Court was attempting to
interpret the ACA’s definition of “State,” determine the term’s
ordinary meaning or, in any genuine sense, declare that the term
must be given some special technical meaning in light of the con-
text.392 The Court did not claim that Congress had explicitly expres-
sed an intention that “State” should include the federal government,
which would be an odd and carelessly expressed congressional
intention considering the definition of “State” in the statute (which
did not, of course, include the federal government).393 Instead, the
real issue was whether the literal meaning of the term, and thereby
the provision, should control or, instead, the provision should be
given a nonliteral meaning.394 The Court itself seemed to realize this
to some degree, indicating that “the context and structure of the Act
386. Id. at 2491.
387. See id.
388. Id. at 2492.
389. Id. at 2496.
390. See id. at 2492.
391. 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (2012).
392. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495.
393. See id.
394. See id.
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compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural
reading of the pertinent statutory phrase.”395
Although the Court likely engaged in the ambiguity discussion as
a way to justify its interpretation (considering that resolving
statutory indeterminacy is seen as less activist than rejecting the
literal meaning of a provision),396 it apparently was not relevant to
whether the agency’s interpretation should receive deference.397 The
Court noted that it “often appl[ies] the two-step framework an-
nounced in Chevron,” which “is premised on the theory that a stat-
ute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to
the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”398 The Court indicated,
however, that “[i]n extraordinary cases ... there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an im-
plicit delegation.”399 The Court explained that the tax credits were
such an issue and that Congress would have delegated the issue
expressly had they wanted the agency to decide it.400
While some might argue that King should be viewed as a
structural indeterminacy case because the Court had to reconcile
the ACA’s various provisions, it is more accurate to frame the case
as involving a lexical meaning issue involving “State.”401 As indi-
cated above, though, the interpretive issue could not straightfor-
wardly be considered a lexical meaning issue due to the weakness
of any claim that the agency was engaged in the construction of se-
mantic meaning.402 The Court implicitly indicated discomfort with
the notion that the agency was engaging in authentic lexical
395. Id.
396. Resolving indeterminacy is a normal and expected function of courts, while inter-
preting a provision contrary to its literal meaning invokes the image of the controversial case
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States. 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). For an analysis of Holy
Trinity, see VERMEULE, supra note 291, at 93-107. The legitimacy of judicial deviations from
literal meaning, and the continuing relevance of Holy Trinity, were hotly debated by Justice
Stevens, via concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia, via dissenting opinion, in Zuni Public
School District No. 89 v. Department of Education. 550 U.S. 81, 104-05, 108 (2007).
397. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
398. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 159 (2000)).
399. Id. at 2488-89.
400. Id. at 2489. See supra note 58 and accompanying text for the full quote.
401. Even if the case were viewed as a structural indeterminacy case, under the framework
offered in this Article the Court would still interpret the statute independently. See supra
notes 242, 294 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 388-93 and accompanying text.
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construction by indicating that there was no possibility, based on
the “extraordinary” exception, it would defer to the agency’s inter-
pretation.403 Instead, the best justification for the Court’s interpre-
tation is that it adopted a nonliteral meaning of the provision on the
basis that doing so would further the statutory design (unlike the
literal meaning of “State”).404 As such, the decision should be seen
as an example of the principle suggested in this Article that inter-
pretive issues involving literalness are for courts to resolve, as they
invariably require a determination of whether a nonliteral meaning
is consistent with the statutory design.405 The Court was thus just-
ified in refusing to give Chevron deference to the agency’s inter-
pretation, although its reasoning was flawed.
3. Agency Interpretations that Incorrectly Adhere to Literal
Meaning
As explained earlier, one consequence of the high level of gen-
erality at which many texts in the administrative state are drafted
is that agency jurisdiction to regulate may fall within the scope of
the literal meaning of a provision yet conflict with overall legislative
design.406 Similar to cases involving structural indeterminacy and
agency departures from literal meaning, courts should presume that
such issues are judicially decidable. Consider, for example, the FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., case involving a challenge to
the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulation of tobacco
products.407 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) granted the
FDA the authority to regulate, among other items, any “drug” or
“device.”408 In 1996, the FDA asserted jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products, concluding that, under the FDCA, “nicotine is a
‘drug’ and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are ... ‘devices’”
that deliver nicotine to the body.409 The FDCA provided a capacious
definition of “drug,” indicating that it included “articles (other than
403. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
404. See id. at 2495.
405. See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 361-71 and accompanying text (explaining the issues caused by
generality).
407. See generally 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
408. See id. at 129.
409. Id. at 131.
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food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”410
Similarly, it provided that a “device” was “an instrument, appara-
tus, implement, machine, contrivance, ... or other similar or related
article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is ...
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”411 The
Act also granted the FDA the authority to regulate so-called “com-
bination products,” which “constitute a combination of a drug, de-
vice, or biological product.”412 The FDA construed the provision as
giving it the discretion to regulate combination products as drugs,
as devices, or as both.413
Despite the very broad terms of the F.D.C.A., the Court consid-
ered the overall legislative design of the statute and determined
that the provisions at issue could not be interpreted in accordance
with their literal meanings.414 Thus, the statute did not give the
FDA the authority it claimed over tobacco products.415 As in King v.
Burwell, the Court declined to grant Chevron deference to the agen-
cy’s interpretation based on “the nature of the question presen-
ted.”416 Specifically, “[i]n extraordinary cases ... there may be reason
to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended ... an
implicit delegation” of interpretive authority to the agency.417 In
Williamson Tobacco Corp., the issue was whether the agency could
adhere to the literal meaning of a provision, while in King the issue
was whether the agency could deviate from a provision’s literal
meaning, yet in both cases the Court believed the interpretive issue
to be judicially decidable because of its importance.418
410. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(c) (2012).
411. Id. § 321(h).
412. Id. § 353(g)(1).
413. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents; Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 44400 (Aug. 28, 1996).
414. See Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133.
415. Id. (“Congress has directly spoken to the issue here and precluded the FDA’s
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.”).
416. Id. at 159. Recall that the Court in King cited Williamson Tobacco Corp. in support
of its holding that agency interpretations do not receive deference if the interpretive issue is
“extraordinary.” See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
417. Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159.
418. See supra notes 383-405, 407-15 and accompanying text.
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4. Indeterminacy Involving Literal Meaning
Implicit in mandatoriness of literal meaning cases is the assump-
tion, reminiscent of the structural indeterminacy category, that
there will be pragmatic evidence sufficient to enable the reviewing
court to resolve whether adherence to a provision’s literal meaning
is mandated or prohibited.419 Despite the judicial decidability of
literal meaning issues, there may be situations where a deviation
from literal meaning is neither precluded nor required. Congress
sometimes designs statutes assuming that the relevant agency will
create exceptions to the enacted language, but whether the excep-
tions are warranted and adequately justified is separate from the
issue of whether Congress has sanctioned such deviations.420 The
content and scope of such exceptions may be matters of policy, but
the sanction to create exceptions is one of legislative design.421
Consider the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Negusie v. Hold-
er,422 where the agency argued that the so-called “persecutor bar,”
making an alien ineligible for asylum if she has persecuted others,
applies even if the alien’s involvement in persecution was the
product of coercion or duress.423 The provision itself did not explicitly
address the issue, indicating only that “[t]he term ‘refugee’ does not
include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”424 The interpretive dispute could be framed in
alternative ways. One issue is whether the agency is bound by the
literal meaning of the provision, which does not explicitly provide
for any exceptions.425 The other issue concerns the meaning of
“persecution” and whether the meaning of the term requires moral
blameworthiness.426 Not surprisingly, the government framed the
419. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (explaining why structural indeterminacy
reconciliation cases are judicially decidable).
420. See supra notes 353-57 and accompanying text (explaining why the literal meaning
of a provision might not constitute its legal meaning).
421. See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
422. 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
423. Id. at 514.
424. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
425. Cf. id.
426. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517-18.
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question to be answered as whether the provision should be inter-
preted literally (arguing that it should), and the petitioner focused
on the meaning of “persecution.”427 Obviously, though, the two
possibilities could be addressed in the same interpretive dispute.428
In order to win, the government would have to argue that the pro-
vision should be interpreted literally (or that some recognized
exception did not apply in the present case) and that the term
“persecution” did not require moral blameworthiness (or, if it did,
that the petitioner was blameworthy).429
At the outset of its decision, the Court indicated that “[i]t is well
settled that ‘principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this
statutory scheme.’”430 The case was remanded back to the agency,
though, on the basis that it had misinterpreted an earlier Supreme
Court case, Fedorenko v. United States,431 as mandating that it is
irrelevant for persecutor-bar purposes whether the petitioner had
been compelled to assist in persecution.432 In the Court’s view, the
agency had “not exercised its interpretive authority” but had instead
merely determined that Fedorenko controlled.433 Remand to the
agency was appropriate because the question “[w]hether the statute
permits [consideration of coercion or duress] based on a different
course of reasoning must be determined in the first instance by the
agency.”434 Consequently, “[w]hether such an interpretation would
be reasonable, and thus owed Chevron deference,” was not an issue
then before the Court.435
427. Id. at 518 (explaining the government’s argument that the statute “directly answers
that question: there is no exception for conduct that is coerced because Congress did not
include one” (internal quotations omitted)). 
428. See id.
429. See id. at 517-18.
430. Id. at 516 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999)). In contrast, in
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stevens argued that the
interpretive question was a “pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide.”
Id. at 529 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446 (1987)); see also supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text (describing Justice
Stevens’s views on the distinction between pure and applied questions of law).
431. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
432. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522-23.
433. Id. at 522.
434. Id. at 523.
435. Id. at 521.
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As indicated above, the issue whether the literal meaning of a
provision must control should be deemed decidable by the review-
ing court, although of course the government’s views on the inter-
pretive dispute may be valuable to the reviewing court (perhaps
justifying the decision in Negusie to remand to the agency).436 It is
the reviewing court’s duty to ensure that the agency is acting within
the bounds of the law, and determining whether the literal meaning
of the statutory language should control is something that courts
should be able to discern.437 Although the issue whether the statute
requires deviation from the literal meaning should be presumed to
be judicially decidable, one may object that the issue calls for def-
erence because the statute, as Justice Scalia argued, neither pre-
cluded nor mandated the recognition of a duress defense.438 The two
separate issues should not, however, be conflated. The Court must
determine whether the legislative design precludes, permits, or (in
atypical situations) mandates departure from the literal meaning of
the provision.439 Only if the provision permits, but does not require,
departure from the literal meaning of the provision does the issue
become one of policy for the agency to decide. In this situation, then,
the agency’s role does not involve statutory interpretation but,
rather, policymaking.
436. See supra notes 431-33 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
438. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The statute does not mandate the
rule precluding the duress defense but does not foreclose it either; the agency is free to retain
that rule so long as the choice to do so is soundly reasoned, not based on irrelevant or
arbitrary factors (like the Fedorenko precedent).”).
439. See supra notes 360-62 and accompanying text. In King, for instance, it could be that
the statute mandated a departure from the literal meaning of the statutory text in order to
avoid undermining the legislative design. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015).
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CONCLUSION
For over three decades, Chevron has been an enormously
controversial precedent, in part because the nature of its two-step
doctrine appears transformative yet its exact meaning is uncer-
tain.440 The doctrine, unconstitutionally to some, arguably shifts
interpretive responsibility from courts to agencies, but, at least to
some judges, does not require a reviewing court to accept an
interpretation with which it does not agree.441 Some of this uncer-
tainty can be traced to Chevron’s ambiguity concept, perhaps its
least convincing contribution to judicial review.442 This aspect of
Chevron has received little attention compared to its other fea-
tures.443 Nevertheless, revising this element of Chevron, while not
addressing various aspects of judicial review, can make the stan-
dard of review both consistent with historical judicial practice and
congruent with current research on language.444 
No realistic doctrine of review can avoid judicial disputes in
individual cases about the “best reading” of a provision, but a
reassessment of indeterminacy can make the process of interpreta-
tion more coherent.445 Reforming how courts view indeterminacy
should make a standard of review requiring deference to some
agency interpretations seem less like an abdication of judicial re-
sponsibility than does the current Chevron doctrine.446 Under the
framework advocated in this Article, reviewing courts independently
reconcile potentially conflicting provisions and determinants of
meaning, determine whether agency adherence to the literal mean-
ing of a provision is mandatory or prohibited, assess the semantic
440. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting that there is an enormous body of
scholarship that has been devoted to Chevron, which is an indication of the uncertainty
surrounding its meaning and significance).
441. See supra note 145 (describing Justice Scalia’s view that Chevron did not require him
to accept an interpretation with which he did not agree).
442. See supra notes 187-217 and accompanying text (criticizing Chevron’s ambiguity
concept).
443. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
444. See supra Part IV.A.
445. Cf. Robert A. Katzmann, Response to Judge Kavanaugh’s Review of Judging Statutes,
129 HARV. L. REV. F. 388, 398 (2016) (arguing that there will always be “legitimate differences
about what is the ‘best reading’” of a provision “whenever there is ambiguity”).
446. See supra Part IV.A.
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meaning of the provision at issue, and consider whether contextual
evidence precludes the agency’s interpretation.447 Each of these
functions is consistent with the traditional responsibility of courts
to decide questions of law. Furthermore, such determinations would
not be subject to revision by the relevant agency.448 Still, the nature
of word meanings, the uniqueness of much of the language in
administrative statutes, and the likelihood of congressional intent
to delegate such issues to agencies, should convince courts that
semantic indeterminacy resolution is properly viewed as a job for
agencies, subject to the reviewing court’s assessment of pragmatic
evidence of legislative intent.
447. See supra Part IV.A.
448. As discussed earlier, the Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunication
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services held that a court’s prior construction of a statute trumps
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the provision is
unambiguous. 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). This holding should not apply to matters of
interpretation but, rather, only to policy decisions. Thus, situations involving structural
indeterminacy reconciliation and literal meaning mandatoriness, which involve making sense
of the legislative design, should not be subject to revision by the agency.
